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Abstract
In 1970 the Department of Defense introduced the Department of Defense
Directive 5000 to standardize the acquisition process; the directive created oversight
forums to ensure the policies and procedures created were followed, track program
progress, and identify programs in trouble. Although oversight was essentially created to
help reduce the cost of acquisitions, there is reason to believe that it may increase the
costs; however, because there has only been a few studies conducted that estimated the
cost of oversight no one knows how much “oversight” costs individual programs.
Numerous oversight processes are being used today, but no research shows one process is
any different from the other. Nor have studies been done to determine the cost drivers
for oversight.
This thesis will provide a foundation and potential cost saving recommendations
that would benefit the Department of Defense in most of the acquisition programs it
monitors. An estimated cost of oversight will be calculated for programs following three
different oversight processes using the Delphi Methodology. The estimates will be
compared to determine if there are any statistical differences between them. A future
track for the next generation of oversight processes will develop from the
recommendations.
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ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION TO CAPTURE THE COST OF
OVERSIGHT FOR A MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAM WITHIN THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) ACQUISITION COMMUNITY
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Overview
War preparation has been one constant throughout the history of the United States
(U.S.). Today the U.S. spends billions of dollars on research and development and
procurement of weapon systems and other major defense acquisition programs annually.
For the purpose of this thesis, the definition of major defense acquisition programs
(MDAP) will be taken from the February 23, 1991 version of the Department of Defense
(DoD) Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedure.
That version of the DoD Instruction 5000.2 defined an MDAP, as “a directed, funded
effort that is designed to provide a new or improved materiel capability in response to a
validated need. MDAPs must have an eventual cost of $200 million in research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) cost, and at least an eventual $1 billion cost
in procurement expenditures both of which are in fiscal year (FY) 1980 constant year
dollars” (14:1).
The acquisition cost for an MDAP can reach astounding numbers. Therefore, it is
imperative that the stakeholders in the process be prudent and efficient when dealing with
these programs because all funding for these programs are appropriated funds from
Congress. Both Congress and the DoD have a responsibility to the taxpayers to ensure
the funds entrusted in them are not caught up in some type of fraud, waste, or abuse.
Over the years, US government agencies have tried to reduce the amount of inefficiencies
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within the acquisitions process by developing and implementing policies and procedures
for the acquisitions community. Official guidelines implemented to regulate the
acquisition process date back to the late 1960s, and the regulations have been changed
and reformed continuously.
Some of the more recent changes to the policies and procedures can be attributed
to the fall of the Soviet Union, and that is when the U.S.’s approach to national defense
had to change. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many Americans believed that the U.S.
could reduce spending on its national defense programs because the number one enemy
was no longer a viable threat. With a decrease in support for defense spending, mainly
production dollars came budget cuts and a major transformation of the DoD. Major
advancements in technology also helped transform the acquisition process. Since the
defense budget shrank over the next 10 years, the way the DoD acquired its weapon
systems and other defense programs had to be streamlined to get the most “bang for the
buck.” The government could no longer afford to overrun budgets or delay schedules
without being accountable for each schedule delay or budget increase. Because the dollar
amounts spent on acquiring MDAPs is a significant part of the nation’s defense spending,
there have been many studies conducted to ensure the acquisitions process is both
efficient and effective, although little, if any, research has examined the cost of oversight.
While several initiatives have been put in place to reduce the cost of acquisitions, there
has been minimal work done on how to capture the actual cost of oversight for MDAPs.
Some programs have been given the freedom to develop their own policies and
procedures, some have received waivers from the policies and procedures altogether, and
some have been given the authority to use non-traditional methods when going through
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the approval process, but the programs must use the guidance set by the DoD 5000 series
which has been put in place to govern the acquisition process.
This thesis will estimate the actual cost of oversight of a MDAP that used nontraditional methods for obtaining approval using the DoD 5000 series as its governing
regulations. This chapter will cover the background and the problem, provide some
assumptions, set the scope and outline the methodology.
1.2 Background
Acquisition oversight as we know it today began in the late 1960s. “The Defense
Systems Acquisitions Review Council (DSARC) was created to advise then Deputy of
Secretary of Defense (SecDef), David Packard, on the status and readiness of each major
defense system to proceed from one phase to the next” (1:20). The DSARC was used to
monitor the progress of major acquisitions programs, and would allow the DoD to
regulate the acquisition process and ensure that the program was moving along according
to schedule. After the creation of DSARC, Packard authored two memorandums. One
requested input on ways to improve the acquisitions process and the other cited ways the
acquisitions process could be improved (1:21). Packard believed that there had to be
guidelines put in place for all members of the acquisition workforce to follow. In 1971
the first set of regulations was released and implemented DoD wide. According to
Ferrara, the first copy of the DoD 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2, better known as
the DoD 5000 Series was issued in July 1971 (21:111). It would be one of the first
attempts to regulate the acquisition process. However, it would only be the beginning of
a string of changes and reiterations of the same document. To date, every presidential
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administration since Nixon’s administration has made some type of change to the series
(21:115). The latest update to the series was released in May 2003.
1.3 Problem
During the 1990s, acquisition reform was a major priority for the Clinton
administration as major problems with the acquisition process were brought to public
attention. Many Americans felt the government was abusing its power and taking
advantage of the tax dollars appropriated for acquisitions. According to Gregory, “in the
minds of much of the citizenry, the Pentagon procurement system is scandalous and the
defense industry is manned by fast-buck artists, incompetents, or deranged Dr.
Strangeloves who, when they lack weapons of mass destruction to tinker with, design
$600 hammers or $5,000 coffeepots” (24:1).
Since most Americans believed paying $600 for hammers or $5,000 for
coffeepots was excessive, DoD looked at the way they acquired items. The coffeepot and
hammer cost were both exaggerated examples of the public perception; however, these
incidents were “wake up” calls to the government along with the acquisitions community.
Because the government’s acquisition process is subject to public scrutiny, Congress and
DoD must ensure that the policies and procedures put in place to regulate the process are
flexible yet stringent enough to react to the forever changing needs of the government.
Although oversight is needed within the process, it must be tailored to the situation in
order to eliminate non-value-added processes that only add to the increasingly high cost
of acquisitions.
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1.4 Assumptions
For the purpose of producing results that can be compared to the results gathered
from other MDAP programs within traditional and space environment, some assumptions
had to be made. The following assumptions were used for the purpose of conducting this
research:
1. Assume that the program has stable requirements and a stable budget
2. Assume that the studies performed on the oversight process accurately
depict the normal process as defined in the DoD 5000 series
3. Assume the exterior agencies or services do not adversely affect the
measures of performance used by the programs being studied
4. Assume the cost are associated only with parameters above the
Program Executive Officer (PEO) level
5. Assume that the oversight cost collected occurs post Milestone A
approval
The assumptions will help increase the interpretability of the data observed. By
narrowing the scope of the study, the results of this research can be compared to the
research being conducted for oversight cost in Space and normal DoD 5000 Series
programs.
1.5 Scope
“In 2001, the Undersecretary of Acquisition Technology and Logistics [USD
(AT&L)], along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command,
Control, and Intelligence) [ASD (C3I)], tasked a Rapid Improvement Team (RIT) to
address reducing the time it took to deliver mission effective Information Technology
(IT) capabilities within 18 months or less to the warfighter” (29: slide 2). According to
the briefing, MDAP programs from the Army, Navy, and the Air Force participated in the
RIT pilot study (29: slide 5); however, this thesis focuses on Air Force test programs
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completed the pilot study. The RIT pilot study was an attempt to reduce acquisition cycle
time by using computer technology and other innovative ideas throughout the approval
process. Although the policies and procedures set by the DoD 5000 series were used, the
RIT established a virtual process that helped reduce the amount of non value added
meetings required throughout the process by putting all available data at each participants
fingertips. The RIT also focused on creating a risk-based approach to oversight that
allows the amount of oversight for a particular program be tailored to fit the need based
on the risk levels of that particular program (29: slide 9). The results of the pilot study
may eventually lead to changes in the way oversight of MDAPs are implemented. The
results of this research will provide senior leaders a first look at just how much oversight
of this type of program cost, and it will help them make better decisions on just how
much oversight is necessary for each individual program.
1.6 Methodology
The first step in conducting this research was to select an MDAP that was a part
of the RIT pilot study, and gain support from individuals within the IT community. By
receiving the support from these individuals early, it ensures that the data required to
conduct this study is available to obtain and analyze. No particular program will be
studied; however, individuals who are experts in the field will be utilized to gain enough
insight to answer the following questions.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

How many meetings were there?
Who attended those meetings?
How long did they last?
Were the meetings local or was there temporary duty (TDY) involved?
How much time was used in preparation of the meeting?
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The Delphi method will be used to generate the overall program oversight cost estimate.
A series of questions will be formulated and distributed to a panel of experts within the
Information Technology (IT) acquisitions community. The expert panel will be asked to
answer the questions and return them to be analyzed. After validation of the data is
complete, cost per hour rates will be calculated for each individual within the process
how has vital role in getting a program approved through the acquisitions process. Some
of the individuals included would be the members of the integrated program team (IPT)
associated with IT programs that took part in the RIT pilot study. Members will be
recommended by their peers and colleagues but will remain anonymous to one another.
In the final stage, the total cost for TDYs, meetings, and personnel will be added together
to calculate the total cost of oversight for a MDAP for one Milestone Decision Point
(MDP). One important thing to remember is that this research focuses on Air Force
programs only.
1.7 Research Objectives and Questions
There have been many reforms initiated to help reduce the cost of oversight
within the information technology, missile defense, and the space and missile
acquisition communities. However, no one has done any research to determine if
these reforms were more effective. Therefore, the main objective of this research is
to determine the cost of oversight within the information technology community after
using a new “virtual” approval process to help reduce the amount of time to obtain
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) approval. The second objective is to compare
the results with other MDAPs (Normal DoD 5000 series rules and regulations and
Space and Missiles) using different processes to obtain MDA approval. This
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comparison will help determine if there is a superior process or it will show there are
no real differences between the different processes. The research will also determine
if there are specific cost drivers for oversight. If the cost drivers are determined, it
will help members of the acquisition community better focus their efforts to make the
process more efficient.
1.8 Summary
This chapter introduced the reason for this research. It also outlined the scope
and gave a brief introduction to the methodology that will be followed for this
research. Chapter 2 of the thesis will give provide information related to the research
from other sources and will give a historical picture of how acquisition has evolved
over the years, and it will also trace the reforms of the DoD 5000 series. More
information on the Delphi Method will be revealed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 defines a
specific course of action to be followed throughout the research process. In Chapter 4,
the results of the research will be given in detail. It will analyze the data collected
using the procedures set in Chapter 3. Conclusions, recommendations, and potential
follow up research will be covered in the final chapter of this research.
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Overview
Over the years, many studies have been conducted on the Department of Defense
(DoD) acquisition process. After all, the United States (U.S) government spends billions
of dollars on weapon systems, information technology, and space programs annually.
According to an audit report filed by the Air Force Inspector General’s office numbered
92-047, “as of March 1991, DoD had approximately 100 active major acquisition
programs with a total value of $838 billion” (14:1). In another report authored by
Czelusniak and Rodgers, they reported that “of the billions of dollars spent on the
nation’s defense, DoD loses approximately $5 billion per year in investment funds due to
cost growth” (10:16). Because appropriated funds are used for the acquisition process, it
is imperative for the DoD to utilize these funds effectively and efficiently. Although
DoD has continued to transform the acquisition process to meet the needs of our
government, there is still room for improvement.
In an attempt to keep cost growth from becoming too expensive, our leaders
continuously monitor cost growth within our acquisition programs and in the early 1970s,
the government released formal policies and procedures for the acquisition process.
According to Ferrara, “the first versions of DoD Directive 5000.1(DoDD 5000.1) and
DoD Instruction 5000.2 (DoDI 5000.2), which are also known as the DoD 5000 series,
were released in mid 1970 and 1971” (21:109). The creation of the DoD 5000 series was
the first step by the government to stabilize the acquisitions process. Along with the DoD
5000 series, oversight groups and forums were also created to help oversee the programs
going through the acquisitions process. In a report to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)
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in 1994, it stated that “oversight verifies, on a continuing basis, that the program is
proceeding according to expectations” (5:15). The DoD 5000 series can be considered
the “bible” for the acquisition process; however, it is a bible that constantly changes.
Over the last 20 years, there have been many revisions and editions of the DoD 5000
series, and the oversight groups and forums have come and gone. One thing has
remained constant throughout the years and that is change. However, changes to the
groups and forums as well as the 5000 series will continue as DoD and our federal
government tries to find a balance between the flexibility within a program office and
control of cost overruns.
The first section of this chapter will identify and define the key terms used in
throughout this thesis. This chapter will also briefly discuss how typical MDAP operates
as outlined in the DoD 5000 series. An evolution of the DoD 5000 series and the
importance of it will follow that section to give a better understanding of why changes
are ongoing. Presidential administration influences will be discussed, and the final
section of the chapter will discuss previous research in the area of cost oversight.
2.2 Definitions
In order to lay a framework for discussion some key terms must be identified and
defined. To begin, for the purpose of this thesis oversight is defined as “the cost
associated with the approval process of an acquisition program for each Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) above the Program Manager (PM) level.” According to the
DoDI 5000.2, “a PM is designated for each acquisition program no later than program
initiation” (15:35). The PM normally reports to a Program Executive Officer (PEO).
The DoD 5000 series says that “unless a waiver is granted, a PEO has to be assigned to
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all Acquisition Category I (ACAT I), Acquisition Category IA (ACAT IA), and sensitive
classified programs, or for any other program determined by the Component Acquisition
Executive (CAE) to require dedicated executive management” (15:35). The PEO is the
executive manager over the PM or PMs they are assigned and report to the Defense
Acquisitions Board (DAB). The DAB is the final formal member of the vertical chain of
command. And the MDA is the final approval authority in determining whether a
program moves horizontally from one milestone to the next. For the purpose of this
thesis, only the vertical levels of approval above the PM will be considered when
determining the cost of oversight. In figure 2.1 below, the vertical levels of approval are
shown in yellow.

DAB

WIPT

PEO

OIPT

PM

Figure 2.1: Oversight Approval Levels
The vertical levels of hierarchy in figure 2.1 appear to be streamlined. However,
outside influences are not accounted for in this diagram. Although the graph doesn’t
show it, the Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) works under the Overarching
Integrated Product Team (OIPT) and neither one is a member of the formal chain of
command for the program approval process, they can have a major impact on a
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program’s progress. An Integrated Product Team (IPT) is a group of functional experts
that has a stake in the operation and success of their assigned program. By using this
type of collaboration method, programs hope to eliminate “stovepipe” holdups within a
program. Since teams are made up of functional experts, they are able to identify and
solve problems quickly to keep their program on schedule. According to Engel, IPTs
were formally codified in the March 1996 version of the DoD 5000 series (19:25). In
chapter 4, these levels will be dissected further to capture the number meetings necessary
before a program is ready to go to the DAB to be reviewed for milestone approval. It
will also place a cost of oversight required to obtain an MDA approval.
2.3 MDAP Operation
Since the early 1970s, the MDAP process has been governed by the DoD 5000
series. Lead by then SecDef David Packard, DoD set out to create some boundaries for
acquisition officials that would lead to a reduction in the cost of acquisitions. And over
the last 20 years the ideas set by Packard have not changed, but the acquisition’s process
has changed numerous times since the creation of the DoD 5000 series. This research
will evaluate how a waiver of procedures to the DoD 5000 series has impacted the cost of
oversight for the IT community. Although the IT community must abide by the rules and
regulations of the DoD 5000 series, it has been given a waiver on the “process”. This
thesis will determine if the changes made to the process increases or decreases the cost of
oversight compared to that of a program not granted a waiver.
2.3.1 Development Stages
Other than making progress through the vertical chain of command, a program
must also make progress through a horizontal development cycle. Although this research
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focuses on a specific section of the development cycle, figure 2.2 shows the horizontal
steps a MDAP must progress through for the normal DoD 5000 series process.
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Figure 2.2: Forward Progress (15:2)
The systems acquisition process is composed of all the steps included within Milestone B
and Milestone C. There are steps under Milestone C that continue on after a LRIP
decision, but these are outside the scope of this research. It focuses on getting approval
to progress from Milestone B, the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) stage,
and enter Milestone C, the Production and Deployment (PD) stage. “The purpose of the
SDD stage is to develop a system or an increment, capability; reduce integration and
manufacturing risk…” (15:6). During Milestone A, ideas and needs are refined, but the
program does not enter Milestone B (program initiation) until it has been approved. And
at that point, the program is officially established.
Once the program enters the SDD stage, “the PM must prepare an acquisition
strategy to guide the activities during this stage and it must be approved by the MDA”
(15:7). There are two parts to the SDD: System Integration and System Demonstration.
The DoDI 5000.2 says that “there will be a Design Readiness Review to provide a midphase assessment of design maturity as evidenced by the number of subsystems and
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design reviews completed successfully” (15: 8). In order to exit the SDD stage, Systems
Integration and Demonstration have to be proven, and the MDA must approve each
before the program can progress to the following stage. At the end of the SDD a decision
will be made to either end the program or approve the program for Milestone C and
authorizes it to begin Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP).
The purpose of LRIP is to “result in completion of manufacturing development in
order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the
minimum quantity necessary to provide production or production representative articles
for …<testing>” (15:9). During LRIP production quantities are limited in order to
provide enough units to ensure testing and producibility yet limit the taxpayer expense
before fully approving production. According to DoDI 5000.2, the quantity is normally
limited to, “10 percent of the total production quantity documented in the acquisition
strategy” (15:9). Once LRIP has proven to be successful, the MDA can approve the
program for Full-Rate Production (FRIP) and delivery of the systems to the field. These
systems must attain Initial Operational Capability. The statutory and regulatory
requirements are found in tables at Enclosure 3 of the DoDI 5000.2 (15:10). Once the
systems are fielded to the war fighters the program progresses to the Operations and
Support stage and after the system is relieved of duty it moves into the Disposal phase
which officially ends the program.
2.3.2 Differences in IT Development
Although the cycles for the IT community resemble the normal DoD 5000 series
development cycles, they have created their own process. The IT community needed to
focus on reducing the time needed to field a system. Therefore, the RIT began to assign

14

oversight based on risk. The needs of the IT community were different from that of the
Space and normal DoD 5000 Series programs because they each had different life cycles.
These life cycles made it difficult to have just one way of doing acquisition. The
different life cycles are illustrated below in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Life Cycle Profiles (2: slide 5)
The typical DoD 5000 Series, IT and Space programs require efficient acquisition
processes and the government is trying to adapt to the different situations its faced with
over time. More on the evolution of the DoD 5000 Series and the acquisition process
will be discussed in the following section.
2.4 Evolution of the DoD 5000 Series of Instructions
Now that the acquisition processes for both the normal DoD 5000 series program
and that of the IT community have been described, the next step is to discuss the
evolution of the DoD 5000 series. Since its inception in the early 1970s, the DoD 5000
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series has served as guidance for the acquisition community. Joe Ferrara said in a 1996
article that, the “DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 have been the foundation for the
defense acquisition process for over 20 years” (21:109). Since the issuance of the first
versions of the series, the DoD 5000 series has been rewritten over 10 times, with the first
nine issuances between 1971 and 1993 according to Ferrara (21:109). If studied, each
update to the series provides a bit of historical evidence of the political and economical
climate. The DoD 5000 series was usually updated as a reaction to either the changing of
presidential administrations or changes within the economy. Ferrara points out that the
reason it is important to study the evolution of the DoD 5000 series is that, “the 5000
documents offer a unique window on the evolution of policy in a major government
department” (21:109). Because the DoD 5000 series is the “bible” for the acquisition
process, any revisions to it served as an effort to reform the acquisition process to better
suit the needs of the government and the way it conducted business.
2.4.1 Secretary Packard Leads the Way
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, in the late 1960s began to feel
uneasy about the direction of the acquisition of defense programs. He believed that the
defense acquisition process could use some improvements (21:111). Packard also
recognized that DoD needed to more effectively manage acquisition and control cost
growth (21:110). Deputy Secretary Packard headed a defense acquisition review council
charged to examine the defense acquisition process to discover opportunities to improve
the process. In May 1970, Packard issued a memorandum in which the DoD 5000 series
was conceived (21:111). This memorandum outlined the ideas that would later form the
basis for the first issuance of DoD Directive 5000.1. Some of Packard’s ideas listed
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included, “decentralized execution, streamlined management structures, and use of
appropriate contract mechanisms” (21:111). The first edition of the Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.1 (DoDI 5000.1) was issued in July 1971 and it was filled with
the original ideas of Packard (21:111). Ferrara suggests the original guidelines for the
operation of a defense acquisition program as outlined in the 5000.1 (as envisioned by
Deputy Secretary Packard) have been the driving force behind every acquisition reform
effort and DoD 5000 revision ever since (21:111). There will be changes made by each
presidential administration to the original instructions. Although the first edition stated
that “Layers of authority between the program manager and his Component Head shall be
kept to a minimum” (21:111), senior leaders continue to struggle with that objective.
Advances in technology have forced DoD to adapt to a new economical and acquisition
environment. It is assumed that Packard had an idea that the forces of society would lead
to process changes; therefore, he wanted to reduce the amount of hassle and unnecessary
red tape to help a program continue to progress through the process. However, with each
new publication of the DoD 5000 Series, there is an attempt to find the balance of
oversight that provides the greatest amount of flexibility and ensures the most efficient
deployment of products to the warfighter.
2.4.2 Consistent Themes of the DoD 5000 Series
Over the different variation of the DoD 5000 Series there have been some
consistent principles that remained the same throughout. Ferrara suggests that DoD has
consistently stressed the importance of centralized policy-making and decentralized
program execution, fly before buy, streamlined organizations, limited reporting
requirements, and program stability (21:113-115). By having a central board develop
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policy, the DoD acquisition policies will have the same focus. It also ensures that each
program has a standard set of guidelines to follow. By doing so, DoD hopes that these
policies would help keep the cost of acquisition to a minimum. Because the policy
makers have the best interest of the Department in mind and not their program, they are
better suited to make policies for all DoD entities. However, they realized that the dayto-day decisions of a program should be made by someone who has access to the inside
data on that program. These individuals know what is best for that program and can
make decisions that will help the program along the different stages of development.
They have a better idea of what tradeoffs need to be made when issues arise. This type of
strategy is known today as “tailoring” or “streamlining” the acquisition process to fit a
particular program’s requirements. The basis of thesis was derived on the effects
tailoring or streamlining has on a program’s oversight cost (21:114). Fly before you buy
stresses the importance of testing. If taxpayer dollars are being spent, there should be
some proof that the dollars are being spent on a product that does the job the government
needs it to do. Each edition specifies that dollars should not be committed until it first
proves useful to the warfighter and producible given the current industrial base and
technology. Prototypes should be used when necessary and the product should be
thoroughly tested prior to system fielding. Streamlined organizations are stressed in each
revision because it is important not to have excessive layers in the acquisition process.
Extra layers are more detrimental to an efficient operation because they slow down the
process and add additional costs. Limited reporting requirements attempts to remove
duplicated efforts. Ferrara called these themes the “management principles etched in the
granite of the [first] 5000.1” (21:113) and supports this observation in several instances
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by comparing how different revisions of DoDI 5000.1 address and incorporate the key
themes in a similar manner.
2.4.3 Changes by Administration
As stated before, the DoD 5000 Series has had many changes since its inception
in the early 1970s. One of the major drivers for the changes has been presidential
influence. Beginning with the Nixon era, each administration has changed or revised the
DoD 5000 Series in some way. According to Ferrara, the DoDI 5000.1 was first issued
in 1971 under Nixon with two revisions under President Ford (1975,1977); one revision
under Carter (1980); four revisions under Reagan(1982,1985,1986,1987); one revision
under Bush(1991) and one revision under Clinton(1993) (21:115). There have also been
two revisions under the current President Bush (2000, 2003). The following sections will
try to highlight the changes made during each administration.
2.4.3.1 The Nixon Administration (1968-1974)
The conception of the DoD 5000 Series was a reaction to the rising cost of
defense acquisition costs. It was under President Nixon’s administration that the first
edition of the DoDI 5000.1 was released. It was the first official policy set by the
government. Created from the ideas of Packard, it outlined both the vertical layers of
hierarchy and the horizontal steps required by a program in order to reach full production.
Under the first series, the horizontal steps included program initiation, full scale
development, and production/deployment (21:112). These steps are somewhat similar to
today’s milestones A through C steps, but the final approval authority in the vertical layer
that enabled a program to move from one milestone to the next went all the way to the
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Secretary of Defense level. Nixon’s administration is credited for setting the first official
rules and regulations governing the DoD acquisition process.
2.4.3.2 The Ford Administration (1974-1977)
Under the Ford Administration, there were two revisions made to the DoD 5000
Series. The first change by his administration was made in 1975. Few changes were
made to the document; however, the major change was the issuance of an accompanying
instruction, DoDI 5000.2 signed by the then-Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (21:116). The changes made the new document more user-friendly and it
brought a greater focus to the series itself.
The 1977 revision came in response to “the recommendations of the commission
on government, the establishment of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and the
issuance of Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, and it instituted a new
milestone decision point; Demonstration and Validation (21:117). This initiative
attempted to mitigate technical risks as early as possible in the life of a program. Ferrara
asserts that this event was likely brought about in part due to the large amount of money
being spent to keep up with the Russians as the Cold War had not yet ended (21:117).
2.4.3.3. The Carter Administration (1977-1981)
The Carter administration’s revision in 1980 was very aggressive. It attempted to
reduce cycle time in order to get products to the warfighter more quickly and add more
detail in the form of requiring new documents. In support of reducing cycle time, this
version authorized services to do some novel things including, “omitting phases
altogether” (21:118). This version also expanded the descriptive nature of the DoD
5000.2 Instruction, added a new document, the Integrated Program Summary (IPS) to the
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list of reports required at a major milestone review. According to the revision, the
purpose of the IPS was to provide a document in which the service in charge of the
program could summarize the implementation plan for the life cycle of the product being
developed (21:118). The position of the DSARC Executive Secretary was also described
in the new version.
2.4.3.4 The Reagan Administration (1981-1989)
The Reagan administration has to be considered the most active administration for
making changes to the DoD 5000 Series because there were four revisions during his
eight year administration. The administration released its first DoD 5000 Series revision
in 1985. The series was revised in response to the acquisition horror stories about that
made its way to the public. Accusations of $900 hammers and $500 toilet seats plagued
the media and the government had to respond. Wilbur Jones describes how these stories
affected the climate in Congress in his book Arming the Eagle, “Congress at mid-decade
was overloaded with some 150 different defense procurement bills in the hopper, many
counter productive and contradictory” (27:374). As a response to Congress, the 1985
version created the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The DAE became the single
accountable point of contact over the approval of each acquisition program (21:119).
Great change was in store for the DoD 5000 Series and the defense acquisitions
system between 1986 and 1987. Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Improvement
Act in 1986 to implement the Packard Commission recommendations (21:20). The act
created the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) in response to
recommendation made by the Packard Commission that was formed in 1985 (21:120).
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Almost immediately after assuming the role of USD (A), Richard Godwin
initiated another version of the DoD 5000 series. In the new version, it codified the new
streamlined the chain of command for the acquisition process; it ran from the PM thru the
PEO to the Acquisition Executive. Previously, the Secretary of Defense held the role of
the acquisition executive and corresponding role of milestone decision authority. The
new edition also created three committees that were focused on programmatic matters:
strategic systems, conventional systems, and C3I systems (21:120). The reason for this
was to streamline and cut down on the number of committees that met with the new
Under Secretary as the chair of the DAB and MDA. The article states that at “one count
[the number of committees] went as high as 126 separate boards and councils” (21:120).
The revision also established Milestone IV and Milestone V. Milestone IV was designed
to be a review of the program two to three years after the initial deployment of the system
to assure its operability and supportability, and Milestone V was designed to determine
the operational effectiveness five to ten years after deployment (21:120). Both
milestones were added to ease the minds of critics who questioned the departments’
attention to life cycle implications of new systems (21:120).
2.4.3.5 The George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993)
There was only one revision to the DoD 5000 Series under the Bush
administration. However, those changes were more noticeable than any other changes
made prior to that date. The 1991 revision of the DoD 5000 Series took place as a result
of the 1989 Defense Management Repot (DMR) authored by then Secretary of Defense,
Dick Cheney (21:121). The objectives of the 1991 revision were to create: 1) a uniform
system of acquisition policy, 2) provide rigid guidelines for programs through the
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acquisition life cycle-did not allow services to supplement the DoD 5000 series, 3) made
the DoDI 5000.2 applicable to all acquisition programs not just major programs, and 4)
mandated that all necessary information would be transmitted in writing (a clear
departure from Packard’s vision of less paperwork). And while previous versions failed
to exceed 60 pages, the 1991 version consisted of over 900 pages (21:122). The 1991
version removed all program flexibility by forbidding waivers to the instructions. This
burdened the defense acquisition process because now paperwork was required for
everything!
2.4.3.6 The Clinton Administration (1993-2001)
There were two revisions made during the Clinton era. The first took place early
in the administration in 1993 and very little changes were made. However, the second
edition was released in 1996. The Clinton administration’s version drastically changed
the 1991 revisions to the DoD 5000 Series. It was as if the administration set out to undo
what the Bush administration had done in 1991. Ferrara made the following statement in
his article:
The 1991 documents represented a dramatic centralization of policy control and
procedural specificity. And the 1996 version represents an equally dramatic
reversal of these elements (21:121)!
The 1996 revision was the antithesis of the 1991 version as it attempted to re-instill the
Packard spirit into the regulations. The 1996 version reversed the decision to make the
5000.2 applicable to all programs in an attempt to give more authority and flexibility to
components to run their programs efficiently. It also attempted to respond to the
changing world environment brought on since the end of the Cold War. Since threats to
the United States could come from anywhere at anytime, the acquisition process had to
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be flexible so that the U.S. could respond rapidly to any threats. The 1996 edition
instituted the concept of “Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD),”
Integrated Product Teams (IPT), and it canceled numerous reports required in the 1991
version (21:123). The value of these additions to the 1996 version of the DoD 5000
Series was evident after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The flexibility of the
acquisition process was tested when terrorists hijacked three commercial airplanes,
crashing one into the World Trade Center in New York, one in a field in Pennsylvania,
and the other into Pentagon building in Washington D.C. Although many other changes
had occurred before the attacks, the principle of flexible and responsive systems became
more apparent during that crucial period.
2.4.3.7 The George W. Bush Administration (2001-present)
According to an article written for National Defense Online, president Bush’s
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld demanded the “transformation of the Defense
Department business practices, for greater innovation and flexibility in weapons
acquisition” from the time he stepped into office (20:3). Dr. Rumsfeld’s main vehicle for
codifying his “transformation” was to make changes to the DoD 5000 Series. In the
memo that canceled the DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2, dated 2000 and 2002
respectively, Rumsfeld’s Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz states:
“I have determined that the current subject documents require revision to create
an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and
innovation (42:1).”
Although the DoD 5000 Series was canceled in October 2002, the latest version was
released on May 12, 2003. According to the National Defense article, the reason the
defense department sought to again revise the DoD 5000 series in 2003 was that previous
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attempts at instilling flexibility in the regulations, “…have not gone far enough because
they have not addressed adequately the need for more innovation and efficiency” (20:1).
The author of the article asserts that senior defense officials are still frustrated because,
“…many weapons programs are years behind schedule, as a result of a cumbersome
procurement process, and that acquisition managers don’t work as efficiently as
commercial businesses do, because they are restricted by the rules” (20:2). Erwin
theorizes that despite all of the previous revisions to the DoD 5000 Series, defense
officials see the instructions as requiring too much oversight and that the oversight
continues to slow down the process. In Hawthorne’s briefing entitled “Evolutionary
Acquisition Update and the DoD 5000 Revision, he summed up the DoD 5000 Series
pitfalls prior to its 2003 revision. He stated that the policies were “overly prescriptive”
and did not “constitute an acquisition policy environment fostering efficiency, creativity,
and innovation” (26:14). However, he stated that the objectives of the latest version of
the DoD 5000 Series are to, “encourage innovation and flexibility; permit greater
judgment in the employment of acquisition principles; focus on outcomes instead of
process; empower program manager’s to use the system vice being hampered by
regulation” (26:14).
Over the thirty plus years of the existence of the DoD 5000 Series, the different
presidential administrations attempted to implement procedures in the instructions that
would foster an acquisition environment of “efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and
innovation.” Although the previous changes have only become cyclical points in the
history of the ever evolving DoD 5000 Series, the outcome of the latest version has yet to
be determined, but only time will tell.
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2.5 Previous Research
There has not been a lot of research that focuses on capturing the cost of oversight
of MDAPs. However, there have been studies that examined cost overruns or the cost of
oversight for contractors. This section will discuss some of the research that has been
conducted in these areas. This research is being conducted to fill the gap in current
literature. No previous literature specifically addresses the cost of the vertical levels of
oversight of MDAPs that accrues while an MDAP moves from one stage of development
to the next. A look at studies dealing more generally with the topic of oversight of DoD
acquisition follows.
2.5.1 Contractor Oversight
The cost of contractor oversight was the subject of a 1994 study conducted by the
General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO report, printed in 1997, entitled
Acquisition Reform: DoD Faces Challenges in Reducing Oversight Costs, the GAO
stated that the results of “reinvention laboratories which were conducted in ten different
defense contractor sites in 1994 with an eye on reducing oversight costs” (23:1). This
effort was one of the major reforms to come out of the National Performance Review of
1993. Each of the test sites set up functional evaluation teams consisting of members
from various different government departments, including representatives from weapon
systems program offices. Their objectives were to perform cost benefit analyses of
oversight requirements and eliminate non-value added requirements. It was a large
undertaking with mixed results. The labs’ work resulted in “limited progress in
implementing changes to reduce contractors’ costs of complying with government
regulations and oversight requirements” (23:4). They concluded that although they still
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firmly believed the initiatives were worthwhile, great progress could not be made without
greater support from across the DoD. The GAO report highlights an important part of the
cost of oversight of acquisition programs; however, it deals only with the cost of
contractor oversight, and the costs of government oversight will be evaluated in this
thesis.
2.5.2 Cost Overruns
Over the years different committees have been formed to either reform the
acquisition process or look for ways to help reduce cost overruns. Cost overruns have
often been a problem in acquisition and represent a major reason why the DoD 5000
Series is in existence today. There have been some studies done on the effectiveness of
the recommendations made by committees such as the Packard Commission of 1986. A
study conducted by Christensen, Searle, and Vickery reported in a 1999 Acquisition
Review Quarterly article concluded that “despite the implementation of more than two
dozen regulatory and administration initiatives, there has been no substantial
improvement in the cost performance of defense programs for more than 30 years
(8:252). The report used data from the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)
database and found that Packard Commission initiatives, “did not reduce the average cost
overrun percent experience on 269 completed defense acquisition contracts” (8:251). Of
note, the study concluded that not only were the Packard initiatives ineffective in regards
to reducing cost overruns, but that overall cost overruns on the 269 contracts they
reviewed actually increased (8:258).
In an effort to reduce cost the government has implemented many initiatives. In a
1994 GAO report, it reported that DoD developed new standards to reform the military
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specifications and standards in hopes of reducing acquisition cost (22:1). It also stated
that the DoD military specification process was complex, and often rigid, and blocked the
use of commercial products and processes which prohibited the government from
reducing cost (22:2). The reform being reported built on previous studies in the same
area. The report also stated that most of the recommendations were not new and had
been suggested prior to this report. According to the report, “this reform effort focuses
on changing the acquisition culture and contains several actions to accomplish this
change (22:3). Like others before it, the changes implemented have made no significant
difference in cost overruns within the acquisition process.
In a 1998 article in Acquisition Review Quarterly, Delano stated that the
“Department of Defense acquisition programs and projects frequently experience cost
overruns, performance deficiencies, schedule delays, or cancellation” (12:1). He believed
that because the DoD had such large programs that cost overruns were inevitable (12:1).
Delano set out to find success factors that DoD program managers could effectively
apply to enhance the success of their acquisition programs (12:2). Delano’s goal was to
find success factors that could be implemented quickly without policy changes. His
results did mirror that of previous studies, but he was unable to clearly determine if these
factors would in fact reduce the cost of acquisitions.
2.6 Summary
This chapter presented the guidelines under which an IT program as well as a
normal program must operate. It also defined the important terms that will be used
throughout the thesis, and then it went on to discuss the evolution of the regulatory series
that establishes those guidelines. The chapter also looked at the DoD 5000 changes by
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presidential administration and concluded with a look at some previous research in the
area of cost overruns and oversight. There has not been much studies done in the area of
cost oversight of MDAPs and this thesis will be one of the first steps to determining that
cost. Future research may determine if that oversight is worth its cost.
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3.0 Methodology
3.1 Overview
The previous chapters outlined changing oversight of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs under the guidelines provided in the DoD 5000 series of regulations. The
primary goal for this research is to estimate the cost of program oversight by comparing
the oversight of IT acquisition programs to the oversight of space programs (16:1) and
traditional programs (35:1) using the Delphi. In additional to this goal, the following
additional questions are examined:
1. What is the cost of oversight for an IT program?
2. How does cost of oversight for IT programs compare to other MDAPs using
traditional and nontraditional approaches?
3. What are the drivers for oversight costs?
This chapter outlines the current application of the Delphi Method.
3.2 Delphi Method
This section will provide some background information on the Delphi Method,
and its history will also be discussed. After the background and history of the Delphi
Method is explored, a discussion of what it is and description of how it works will follow.
Once a general understanding of the Delphi Method has been given, it will be obvious
that this methodology provides makes sense to evaluate the research topic. The final
section of this chapter will go into further detail on the reasons for selecting the Delphi
methodology for this research project. The methodology for the execution of this
research project will be combined within of each of the subject areas’ description.
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3.2.1 History of the Delphi Method
According to Linstone and Turoff, “Delphi may be characterized as a method for
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a
group of individuals, as a whole, deal with a complex problem” (30:15). The word
“Delphi” originated from Greek mythology; it refers to a Delphi Oracle which was
capable of predicting the future” (9:376). The Delphi method uses past experiences from
a panel of “experts” without group discussions to predict future outcomes (34:17). This
methodology was developed in the 1950s by the The RAND Corporation when
conducting a study in support of an Air Force exploration and the defense industry as part
of a project called “Project Delphi” (34:17). The U.S. Air Force wanted to determine
what would be key nuclear targets and what would be the likely number of warheads
employed against the United States in the event of nuclear attack by the Soviets. “Project
Delphi” sought to reach a consensus of expert opinion in order to answer those two
critical questions from the viewpoint of a Soviet nuclear strategist. Because there was a
lack of data in this type of research the Delphi method was created.
3.2.2 What is the Delphi Method
The Delphi Method is best described as a communication tool that facilitates a
communication process by allowing a group of individuals to work as a whole to deal
with a problem (6:701). The Delphi Method attempts to reach a consensus of opinions
among the members of a group, which from here on will be referred to as an expert panel,
through a series of questionnaires. The use of anonymous questionnaires in the Delphi
process eliminates heated confrontation amongst panel members because there are no
face to face meetings or discussions throughout the process and replace them with a
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carefully planned, anonymous, and orderly program of sequential individual
interrogations usually conducted by questionnaires” (40:30). Anonymous questionnaires
allow each panel member the freedom of expression. Although panel members are
provided with the overall responses, only the administrator has knowledge of the
participant’s individual responses and arguments. The characteristics of the Delphi
method is intended to overcome the drawbacks of conventionally structured groups by
using the anonymous questionnaire technique (18:25). Another key element of the
process is the panel of pre-selected experts which never has to be physically in the same
location. In the early years of the Delphi process, the studies were conducted using the
traditional mailing system; however, in today’s virtual society, the studies can be
conducted via web-based system, email or a combination of the two methods.
3.2.3 How the Delphi Method Works
The previous section of this chapter offered a preliminary look at how the Delphi
Method works, but this section will go into much greater detail on the workings of the
Delphi Method. First, it is important to answer some questions. The first is why use a
panel of experts that never meet instead of just a single expert. The reason is that an
individual is operating alone which means they could forget something or fail to consider
an issue. Clayton highlighted this issue when he discussed the fact that individuals don’t
get the benefit of hearing the ideas of others so that they can perhaps refine their ideas
(9:375). Clayton goes on to state that by combining the judgment of a large number of
people, there’s a better chance of arriving at the truth.
Having explained why a separated group and not an individual, the question then
becomes, if a group is better than an individual, wouldn’t it be better to put them in a
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room together to allow them to brainstorm and hammer out a consensus? Though this
research operates under Clayton’s premise that the shared ideas of a group of experts is
better than a single expert, putting a panel in a room together could lead to group think
(9:375). This phenomenon is the result of a few dominant personalities controlling the
discussion and potentially strong arming a consensus despite the initial objections of
possibly better informed, yet more timid panel members. Anonymity eliminates the
influence of the dominant individual and reduces both noise and the pressure for
conformity (18:25).
Now that the two preliminary questions regarding the overall set up of the Delphi
Method have been answered, the next step is to describe the workings of the Delphi
Method. To aid in this presentation, the key elements of the workings of the Delphi
Method are explained best in Figure 3.1.
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Distribute Questionaire

Analyse Questionnaire

Consensus Reached?

YES

NO

Provide summarized responses

Develop Final Report

Figure 3.1: Oversight Approval Levels (13:2)
First, a problem is defined. For this research, the research questions are the main
problems defined which is to determine the cost of oversight for IT programs as well as
compare the costs of those IT programs to the “box” and space programs. The other
research focus, using the Delphi Method is to determine key oversight cost drivers. The
next step is to develop a questionnaire that is specific enough to divulge the data
necessary to answer those questions. The following step is to select a panel of experts to
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answer the questionnaire. The questionnaires are then sent to the panel and when
completed they are collected, analyzed, and summarized. If consensus is not reached, the
summarized responses will then be sent back out to the panel to allow them to rethink the
questions now that they have the added benefit of the input from the other group
members. This process of sending out the questionnaires and then getting them back and
analyzing them continues in a looping pattern and each loop is referred to as a “round.”
Each time a new questionnaire is distributed marks the beginning of a new round. The
number of rounds is determined by the achievement of consensus of the expert’s
opinions. Early criticisms of the Delphi Method centered on the fact that originally, (due
to lack of technology) questionnaires were sent by traditional mail channels and
depending on the number of rounds needed to achieve consensus, the process took from
several months up to a year or two to complete. Today’s technology enables the process
to flow much more quickly, and for the purpose of this particular research effort, all
communication during the process will be conducted via e-mail. Chou takes this e-mail
centered Delphi methodology a step further by conducting a web based Delphi Process
whereby panel members and the survey director interact in a shared web program (7:233236). In summary, the Delphi Method, as employed in this research effort, will act as a
communication facilitator that attempts to achieve a consensus of opinions from an
anonymous, geographically separated panel of experts through a series of questionnaires
all conducted via e-mail.
3.2.3.1. The Rounds of the Delphi Method
As previously mentioned, each time a questionnaire is distributed to panel
members and returned to the person directing the research effort constitutes a round of
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the Delphi Method. The big question that arises deals with how many rounds of the
Delphi are necessary to ensure the data is stable. Clayton states that only four phases are
needed and that the final round is sent out to “provide reasons as to why they agree or
disagree with the final results” (9:129). Chan et al. agreed in their study by establishing
four rounds (6:701). Ludwig states that “Delphi rounds continue until a predetermined
level of consensus is reached or no new information is gained” (31:3), but a study in
Scotland by Dr. Kerr limited the number of rounds to 3 (28:3). In recent nursing
research, Hasson et al. limited the number of rounds depending on “time available…”
(25:1011). The research did not find a specific number of rounds needed. Most
researchers using the Delphi Method set the criteria of consensus and time available
while some limited on a firm number. Based on the evidence, the Delphi method as
employed in this research effort to answer the research questions will contain a minimum
of two rounds and a maximum of four.
3.2.3.2 Delphi Method Questionnaires
Mitchell goes into great detail outlining the construction and administration of the
Delphi questionnaires. He clearly outlined the length the questionnaire should be by
stating how long it should take each panel member to complete the questionnaire. On
this topic he states that the questionnaire should take no longer than 30 minutes to
complete (32:345). The basis for this assertion is his own experience as he goes on to
state that there have been no empirical studies conducted on the appropriate length of
time to complete a Delphi questionnaire. Mitchell also discusses the construction of the
questionnaire for each round of the Delphi Method. He states that questions should be
clearly stated and should not be identical from round to round because the repetition
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could cause participant boredom, which could hamper results (32:342). Clayton also
discussed the format of the questionnaires on a round by round basis. He states that the
round one questionnaire should be clearly worded but allow for the most freedom in
responses. Round one responses, once collected, should be turned into generic
statements summarized with measures of central tendency and then resent to panel
members to begin Round two. In round two, the process of seeking consensus begins.
To aid in the quest for consensus panel members that wish to change previous responses
must provide reasons for doing so. In round three and subsequent rounds, questionnaires
should summarized responses with a summary of reasons for changing responses and this
process continues until consensus is met (9:378). The questionnaires in support of this
research effort will be constructed according to the procedures outlined by Clayton and
Mitchell. The number of questions will be limited to ten or less. The maximum amount
of time needed to complete each questionnaire is estimated at 20 minutes. Each returning
questionnaire’s questions are altered in each round based on the previous round’s input.
This will ensure each panel member has the opportunity to re-evaluate each question.
3.2.3.3 Delphi Method Consensus
The rounds of questionnaires must eventually come to a close. In order to set the
parameters prior to beginning, once consensus is reached, the rounds will discontinue.
Webster’s New International Unabridged Dictionary defines consensus as, “unanimity or
general agreement in matters of opinion” (39:567). If that definition is applied to the
Delphi Method as employed in this research effort, once the panel reaches a majority
opinion, the process is complete, but just a majority may not be far enough. Simply
operating under the theme of “majority rule” could overlook important, though less
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frequently occurring opinions. Therefore, in terms of the application of the Delphi
Method for this research effort, consensus must be defined. The problem, as Williams
and Webb state, “Consensus is poorly explained in studies which use the Delphi
technique…” (41:182). Hasson et al. also state that: “A universally agreed proportion
does not exist for the Delphi…” (25:1011). Hasson et al. does list various studies who
established percentages for defining consensus, but all vary dramatically and result in
mostly a straight majority rules. A study completed by Schiebe et al. recommends
stability of responses throughout the rounds as a better indicator of consensus by
evaluating the changes in the questions to a quartile in a distribution (36:IV:C). Without
much empirical evidence to support a concrete definition of consensus, this research
effort will take an approach similar to the one recommended by Schiebe et al. Each
question will be evaluated on the response and as answers become stable, the question
will be considered “closed” until all questions are closed or four rounds have been
completed.
3.2.3.4 Delphi Method Expert Panel
Another obstacle when performing the Delphi Method is deciding how big the
expert panel should be. Spinelli conducted research utilizing the Delphi Method and the
panel consisted of “24 key influential persons knowledgeable as to the factors influencing
the general environment…” (37:74). Ludwig conducted research but had a different
approach to establishing a panel. Ludwig stated that “The number of respondents was
generally determined by the number required to constitute a representative pooling of
judgments and the information summarizing capability of the research team” (31:2). This
establishes the precedent that as long as all members of the focus research are
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represented, the number of members on the panel is up to the researcher. Ludwig then
states “The majority of Delphi studies have used between 15-20 respondents and run over
periods of several weeks” (31:2). Since it seems difficult to find 15-20 volunteers for this
research, further studies were scanned and established more attainable precedents. Chan
et al. stated in their selection process “The ten members of the panel represent a wide
distribution of professional people…” (6:701). Another study by Des Marchais reduced
the panel size to six (17:504). But overall, William and Webb summarize the panel
selection methodology by stating “First, there is no agreement regarding the size of the
panel, nor any recommendations concerning sampling techniques” (41:182).
The panel assembled to answer the research questions posed in this thesis will be
of the heterogeneous type and will embody the principal of breadth of members’
experience while maintaining the similar target career field. The panel will contain a
minimum of four and a maximum of ten members.
Once the size of the panel has been decided, a criterion to determine exactly who
is an expert has to be established. Based on the findings that were a result of the research
conducted to complete this chapter, it appears there is no clear cut definition of what
constitutes an expert. While discussing the topic of expert panel member selection,
Mitchell states, “No reported Delphi study has addressed this selection issue” (32:340).
In their research, Dawson and Brucker summarized the criteria for determining experts
used in several Delphi studies in their field (11:132). The common theme was: general
experience of seven years; specific experience of five years; at least one published article;
at least one national conference presentation; and experience should be recent to within
the last three years (11:132-134). For the purpose of this research, we’ll relax those
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general standards a bit by requiring: general experience of five years; specific experience
of two years; recent experience within the last five years; and no qualification of
presentations or publications.
Once the expert panel is formed, but prior to the process starting, a plan must be
instituted for panel attrition. In a study by Chan et al. conducted in the field of medicine,
they achieved a response rate of 80% and went on to state that derived from various
studies that the average response rate for the medical field ranged from 58% to 80%
(6:708). Mitchell states that, “High rates of attrition may mean that final results are based
upon an unrepresentative sub sample of the original sample” (32:341). To combat panel
attrition and the resulting degraded response rates, this research effort will choose experts
from different but related fields and have at least one backup expert for every expert so in
the end, even with an attrition as high as 50%, all groups will be represented and the bias
that Mitchell describes will be avoided.
3.3 Uses of the Delphi Method
The Delphi Method has had many uses in research. According to the book The
Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, the Delphi Method was principally used as
a forecasting tool back as early as the 1960s and went on to say today the Delphi Method
is used for: normative forecast; to ascertain values and preferences; quality of life
estimates; simulated and real decision making; and inventive planning. The book also
went on to state that the Delphi Method is used extensively where “judgmental input
data” is needed when other data is unavailable or too costly (30:615). Hasson et al. stated
that the Delphi Method is used frequently in health and social sciences (25:1008).
Mitchell’s article cites a table listing the use of the Delphi method by percentage by field
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of study from a total of 800 studies. Delphi was most heavily used in physical sciences
and engineering (26% of all studies conducted) and the second most frequent usage was
in business and economics (23%) (32:334).
3.4 Criticisms of the Delphi Method
If employed properly, the Delphi Method is an excellent tool for gathering data to
answer questions when that data first appears to be unavailable. Since this research effort
originally sought to analyze historical data and because that data was unavailable, the
Delphi Method appeared to be a suitable backup method. However there are criticisms of
the Delphi Method. The first criticism deals with who actually decides what qualifies as
an “expert”. Clayton acknowledges that expertise is not exactly measurable however, he
states that the criteria is really relative based on the peers of the experts. For this research
effort, criteria for panelists will be based criteria found in the section on the expert panel
found in this chapter. Using Clayton’s premise that experts are deemed as such by their
peers, the research will include a preliminary survey of potential experts. We’ll supply
them with our panel criteria and ask them whether they agree with each of the criteria or
not and why.
Williams and Webb introduce a second criticism of the Delphi Method which is
that the researcher’s analysis and summary of each rounds’ responses could introduce
bias into the process (41:182). That point is well taken and to combat that threat,
responses will be analyzed using basic statistical methods (mean, median, standard
deviation) to the fullest extent possible. Additionally, because this research will conduct
the Delphi Method as part of a group project, there will be more than one set of eyes
analyzing the responses which should also help to keep the process honest.
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A final criticism of the Delphi Method regards the question of reliability;
specifically, what evidence is out there that proves the Delphi Method is reliable. In
other words, have studies been conducted that prove findings were consistent in different
Delphi experiments using similarly composed panels answering the same questions.
Williams and Webb found that, “there is no evidence that the Delphi Method is reliable”
(41:182). Hasson et al. support these findings stating that their research discovered,
“There is no evidence of the reliability of the Delphi Method” (25:1012). Mitchell stated
that other studies have found a high degree of replicability which would contradict the
criticism that the Delphi Method is unreliable or at the very least unproven (32:351).
3.5 Strengths of the Delphi Method
The strengths of the Delphi Method outweigh the weaknesses previously
mentioned. First, the Delphi Method enables a group of experts in geographically
separated locations to work together without the cost or other logistical problems
associated with bringing experts together at a central location (11:129). Anyone who has
tried to put together a major conference would greatly appreciate this strength.
The second strength focuses on the fact that the Delphi Method results in a
consensus of opinion without the bias or group think that might result from a roundtable
process (41:181). This “anonymous factor” ensures all panel members are equally
involved and all panel members feel free to answer honestly. By this, the researcher has
the opportunity to receive uncensored answers.
Williams and Webb’s research also highlights the Delphi concept of conducting a
series of rounds to achieve consensus (41:181). The series of rounds allows panel
members to review the responses of their fellow panel members and gives them the
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chance to reconsider or even alter their original responses with the benefit of the added
input of their fellow panel members. Conducting only one round would destroy the
intellectual synergy created by the sharing of ideas throughout the rounds.
Finally, a criticism of the traditional Delphi process (the process was too long to
complete) has evolved into a strength. This long time period was due to the fact that it
was used in the 1960s and 1970s at a time when there was no means other than through
postal channels to conduct Delphi rounds. Chou’s article highlights the final strength of
the Delphi that evolved—speed. Chou stated that traditional Delphi processes averaged
six to twelve months from start to finish, but with e-mail and web-based Delphi a three
round study can be conducted in four weeks (7:236).
3.6 The Reason the Delphi Method was Chosen
The originally theorized methodology for this research effort was to examine the
paper trail left by an actual MDAP going through a milestone decision point i.e. Meeting
minutes, meeting notes, sign in rosters to arrive at an estimated cost of oversight. Using
these documents, the ranks and number of people at the meetings could be ascertained as
well as the number and duration of the meetings. This data could then be used to
estimate a cost of meetings based on length of meeting and the hourly wages of each
attendee. The estimate for meeting costs at every level of vertical oversight could then
be tallied to arrive at a total estimate of the cost of oversight for an MDAP at a certain
key decision point. The problem encountered with this methodology was the lack of
data. Assuming that meeting minutes, notes, and logs would be readily available was a
mistake. In some cases these items were nonexistent. Therefore, the methodology used
for the purpose of this research had to be able to answer the research questions without
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the availability of historical data. An article by V.W. Mitchell that appeared in
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, outlines why one would use the Delphi
Method with the number on reason listed being the unavailability of historical data
(32:338).
3.7 Comparative Analysis for Data Collected
Once the rounds of the Delphi are completed, data collected from this study will
be compared to the Space data collected by DeReus (16:1) and the “Box” data collected
by Rousseau (35:1). The data collected for all questions on the questionnaires will be
statistically analyzed using a software package containing a graphical user interface, such
as JMP 5.0.1 statistical software. The data will be analyzed to determine if there are any
statistical differences in cost of oversight amongst the three processes.
3.8 Summary
This research effort is aimed at answering the following research questions:
1. According to the panel of experts, what is the cost of oversight for an IT
program using the RIT process?
2. How does the cost of oversight for an IT program compare to the cost of
oversight for Box and Space programs?
3. What are the top five cost drivers for the oversight of IT acquisition programs?
This chapter outlined exactly how this research effort will answer those questions.
In summary: the research will consist of assembling a panel of five to ten experts in the
field of defense acquisition; prepare questionnaires aimed at collecting the cost of
oversight at one key decision point and aimed at identifying oversight cost drivers; then
employ the Delphi Survey technique of sending out the questionnaires, collecting,
analyzing, summarizing, and resending questionnaires to the panel; and continue with the
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Delphi rounds until a consensus of expert opinion is reached. In Chapter 4, the results of
each round’s questionnaires will be recorded and summarized.
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4.0 Data Results
4.1 Overview
The goal of Chapter 4 is to provide the results of the data collected from the
members of the panel of experts used in the Delphi Method. In the first section of this
chapter, only general demographics of the panel members will be provided to ensure
anonymity of the members. The next section will provide the results of the survey for
each question. Results will be presented for each of the ten questions and will include
initial answers to the questions and any changes made during the four separate rounds of
the Delphi Method. The final section will provide a review of the change in the standard
deviation for each question. The chapter will conclude with the final numbers to be
analyzed and will be used to statistically compare with the results from studies conducted
by Rousseau (35:1) and DeReus (16:1).
To establish the cost of oversight, an algorithm was created which multiplies and adds the
respondents’ estimates together to create low, average, and high estimates for the cost of
oversight. By multiplying the results of specific questions together, the algorithm works.
For example, to obtain a TDY cost estimate, questions two, three, and four are multiplied;
to create a personnel cost estimate, questions five, six, and seven are multiplied;
questions eight, nine, and ten are multiplied together to create a meeting cost estimate.
Finally, to arrive at a total program cost for one milestone decision point, the estimates
for TDY, personnel, and meeting are added together. The total program cost for the low
estimate is then represented by the following algorithm:
3*((Q2low*Q3low*Q4low)+(Q5low*Q6low*Q7low)+(Q8low*Q9low*Q10low))

46

The total program cost for one milestone decision point has to be multiplied by “3”
because there are three milestone decision points. The same process is used to obtain the
average and high estimates.
4.2 Panel Selection
The goal of panel selection was to gather experts within the IT community with
the appropriate acquisitions’ experience. A varied breadth of experience amongst the
panel members was also a goal in order to collect data from individuals with different
opinions because of different experiences. The demographics of the selected panel of
experts are listed in table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Panel Selection Demographics
Number

Military/Civilian

Position

Acq Exp

IT Exp

(Years)

(Years)

1

Military

Military Officer

10

5

2

Civilian

Retired Civil Servant

30

30

3

Civilian

Retired Military Officer;

30

20

29

20

Contractor
4

Civilian

Civil Servant

With the panel members numbered, the remainder of the results and analysis will
refer only to the number assigned for the Delphi Method. Although the table looks heavy
with civilian experience, the military viewpoint is represented from both the “worker
bee” (Junior officer) and senior staff levels (Retired O-6). With an average of 24.75
years of defense acquisition experience and 18.75 years of IT acquisition experience this
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panel of experts has a wealth of experience to offer. The panel members have worked at
various levels of the acquisition process. Their experiences levels range from the
Program Office IPT levels through the OSD levels which provides enough breadth of
experience to provide the appropriate level of heterogeneity referred to in the
methodology section of this thesis. The differences of the panel members will provide
the greatest probability of approaching the true answer of the unknown forecast we are
trying to make and compare. Prior Internal Review Board permission was requested and
obtained for this research and the letter of approval can be seen in the attachment section.
4.3 Question One
From the Program Executive Officer (PEO) request for a Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB to the DAB milestone approval, what are the five major cost drivers
in the oversight process?
The goal of question one was to obtain the top five cost drivers, according to the
respondents, that drove the cost of oversight. There were no stipulations placed on the
answers to be provided by the panel members; however, they were limited to five
responses.
4.3.1 Results by Round
In round one, the panel was asked to provide the top five cost drivers within the
oversight process but they were asked to put them in no particular order. In all, the panel
members identified a total of 18 cost drivers, and they are listed below:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Documentation development
Documentation review/staffing
Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq strategy re-do
Changing oversight requirements
After Milestone B, future milestones require less effort since much of the
groundwork is already complete
6. Lack of oversight requirement and process
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7. Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood
8. Travel and prep work
9. Review and approval of ORD/Architecture
10. Review and approval of Cost Estimate
11. Review and approval of Clinger-Cohen Act
12. Review and approval of C4ISP
13. Review and approval of TEMP
14. Lack of defined and managed acquisition processes in the PEO/PMO
15. The need for OSD to serve as MDA when there is no defined or managed acq.
process in the PEO/PMO
16. Lack of trust by OSD gate keepers in the Component counterparts thus
preventing them from delegating
17. The serial process of document approval by several echelons of oversight
18. The lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique C4ISP
efforts
For round two, the 18 items received from round one were sent back out to the
panel members. They were then asked to select the five of the top cost drivers from the
list and put them in the provided space on the survey. Seven drivers were dropped from
the list because they received no votes. The following drivers were sent back to the panel
members for round two. They are listed in no particular order.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Documentation development
Documentation review/staffing
Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq. re-do
Changing oversight requirements
Lack of oversight requirement and process
Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood
Travel and prep work
Lack of defined and managed acquisition processes in the PEO/PMO
Lack of trust by OSD gate keepers in the Component counterparts thus
preventing them from delegating
10. The serial process of document approval by the several echelons of oversight
11. The lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique C4ISP
efforts

As for round three, there were a total of 11 drivers sent back to the panel members
with the same instructions given in round 2. This time, only two items were dropped
because they received no votes. The results from round three are listed below:
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Votes
1. Documentation Development
1
2. Documentation review/staffing
1
3. Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq strategy re-do 3
4. Changing oversight requirements
3
5. Lack of oversight requirement and process
0
6. Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood 3
7. Travel and paperwork
0
8. Lack of defined and managed acquisition processes in the PEO/PMO 2
9. Lack of trust by OSD gatekeepers in the Component counterparts thus
preventing them from delegating
3
10. The serial process of document approval by the several echelons
of oversight
2
11. The lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique
C4ISP efforts
2
Since the goal of question one was to identify only the top five drivers, the drivers
from the round three results that received only one vote were also eliminated from the
fourth survey sent to the panel members. With only one round remaining, eliminating the
drivers with the fewest votes was determined to be the best way to narrow the list down
to one that would meet the goal of identifying just five drivers. After eliminating those
drivers from the list, there were seven remaining drivers in which the panel members
could make there selection. Once again, panel members were instructed to select only the
five drivers they believed to be the top five. However, in the final round they were also
instructed to prioritize their selections. By prioritizing their selections, the data can be
analyzed to create a ranking of the top five cost drivers. A simple average, by adding the
values of the votes and dividing by the number of votes, would provide a scale to rank the
cost drivers. The results from the final round of question one are list below:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Votes
Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq strategy re-do 3
Changing oversight requirements
3
Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood 4
Lack of defined and managed acquisition processes in the PEO/PMO 2
Lack of trust by OSD gatekeepers in the Component counterparts thus
preventing them from delegating
2
The serial process of document approval by the several echelons
of oversight
3
The lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique
C4ISP efforts
3

To arrive at a final top five list of cost drivers, the two drivers that received only two
votes were eliminated from the list, and the list was prioritized using the simple average
technique described above. The final prioritized cost drivers for cost oversight in the IT
community are listed below:
1. Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood
2. Changing oversight requirements
3. The lack of established architecture and the resulting need for unique C4ISP
efforts
4. The serial process of document approval by the several echelons of oversight
5. Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq. strategy re-do
According to the data, “the lack of clearly defined and understood functional
requirements” is the number one cost driver for oversight within the IT community.
4.4 Question Two
From the PEO recommendation, to the DAB approval of the milestone, use your
professional judgment and estimate how many TDYs are taken by one person to
get one program through one Milestone.
The goal of question two was to find out how many TDYs are completed by one
individual in one program to get through one milestone. The members were asked to
provide a low, high and average, or most likely occurrence for this portion. This will
allow us to establish a triangular distribution that will be used later for the data analysis
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portion, as well as to allow us to estimate the low, average, and high costs of oversight
for our comparison of the three different MDAP processes. Question two sets up our
initial number in our algorithm to calculate the first portion of our cost of oversight
model. Question two, three, and four will be multiplied to establish our travel estimate
for the cost of oversight.
4.4.1 Question Two - Low Estimate
The low estimate for round one ranged from two TDYs to twelve TDYs, but that
range shrunk significantly (seven to twelve TDYs) by the end of round four. Although
the median stabilized between rounds two and three it shifted upwards to equal the mode
that was set early on at an estimate of twelve TDYs. A consensus was not reached for
this question, but the data shows very little difference between the mean, median, and
mode for the total TDYs. The standard deviation by the end of round four was less than
three. The results of the low estimates are listed in Table 4.2, shown below.
Table 4.2: Question Two - Low Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
2 to 12
4 to 12
6 to 12
7 to 12

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
12,2,4,12
12,4,10,12
12,6,10,12
12,7,12,12

Mean
7.50
9.50
10.00
10.75

Median
8.00
11.00
11.00
12.00

Mode
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00

Std Dev
5.26
3.79
2.83
2.50

4.4.2 Question Two - Average Estimate
The ranges for the average, or most likely, estimate doubled that of the low
estimate during rounds one through four. There was a wide-range in the early rounds but
that range was cut in half by the end of round four. Although the median increased
throughout the process, the mode decreased from 24 to 20 with three of the four panel
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members selecting 20. Again, consensus was not reached but the standard deviation was
minimized. The results are listed in Table 4.3, shown below.
Table 4.3: Question Two - Average Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
4 to 24
6 to 24
8 to 20
9 to 20

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
24,4,5,24
24,6,15,20
20,8,15,20
20,9,20,20

Mean
14.25
16.25
15.75
17.25

Median
14.50
17.50
17.50
20.00

Mode
24.00
NA
20.00
20.00

Std Dev
11.27
7.76
5.68
5.50

4.4.3 Question Two - High Estimate
The high estimate followed suit with the other two estimates. There was a
difference of 40 at the end of round one but that range decreased to just 18 after the
completion of round four. As the rounds continued, the sizes of the mean, median, and
mode decreased as the range decreased while the standard deviation was minimized to
the fullest by the end of the rounds. Again, the panelist did not reach a consensus, but
three panel members estimated the same number. The results for the question two-high
estimate are found below in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Question Two - High Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
8 to 48
10 to 48
12 to 30
12 to 30

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
48,8,10,48
48,10,20,30
30,12,20,30
30,12,30,30

Mean
28.50
27.00
23.00
25.50

Median
29.00
25.00
25.00
30.00

Mode
48.00
NA
30.00
30.00

Std Dev
22.53
16.21
8.72
9.00

4.5 Question Three
Estimate how many people normally go TDY throughout the Milestone Decision
process.
Question three established another portion of the travel estimate in our cost of
oversight algorithm. The goal of question three is to find the number of personnel that
actually go TDY during the milestone decision process. The respondents were given the
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same instructions as was given with question two and the answers will be presented in the
similar manner.
4.5.1 Question Three - Low Estimate
Question three’s low estimate outcomes were not much difference from that of
question two. Once again, the range from round one to round four decreased; however,
take notice that member one and member four were the outliers. Member one began with
a low estimate and kept it low throughout the Delphi process. Member four started out
high and although the member dropped from 48 to 20, there is still a significant
difference from the final estimate of member one. This is just one example of how the
Delphi process is not completely successful at shortening the range of answers from the
various experts. The various experiences of the panel members could be reasoning for
the differences also. In the end, both the median and mode equaled five, and the mean
was less than nine. The standard deviation is a bit high compared to the ending range but
that is because of the two outliers mentioned earlier. Once again, no consensus was
reached. The results of question three-low estimate are listed below in Table 4.5:
Table 4.5: Question Three - Low Estimate Results By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
3 to 48
3 to 40
3 to 40
4 to 20

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
3,3,5,48
3,3,5,40
3,4,5,40
4,5,5,20

Mean
14.75
12.75
13.00
8.50

Median
4.00
4.00
4.50
5.00

Mode
3.00
3.00
3.00
5.00

Std Dev
22.19
18.19
18.02
7.68

4.5.2 Question Three - Average Estimate
The average estimate also had a wide range of values throughout the process.
Unlike the low-estimates, the average estimates only had one panel member with a vast
difference of opinion. While three of the panel members estimated 10 or below, panel

54

member four started out extremely higher than the other members of the panel. In the
end, member four was still at least threes times higher than that of the other panel
members. Because of the extreme difference, the standard deviation is somewhat high in
comparison to the previous estimate. In this case, the safest estimate would have to be
the mean.
Table 4.6: Question Three - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
6 to 70
6 to 60
6 to 60
7 to 30

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
6,6,10,70
10,6,10,60
10,6,10,60
10,7,10,30

Mean
23.00
21.50
21.50
14.25

Median
8.00
10.00
10.00
10.00

Mode
6.00
10.00
10.00
10.00

Std Dev
31.39
25.74
25.74
10.59

4.5.3 Question Three - High Estimate
The high estimate results listed in table 4.7 show almost the same pattern that
occurred with the low and average results. There was a wide range of estimates from 8 to
100 in the first round but in the final round, it ranged from 12 to 40. The mean, median,
and mode hovered around the low twenties and a consensus was not reached. The results
ended with a fairly high standard deviation at 11.94.
Table 4.7: Question Three - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
8 to 100
8 to 80
12 to 80
12 to 40

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
9,8,20,100
20,8,20,80
20,12,20,80
20,12,20,40

Mean
34.25
32.00
33.00
23.00

Median
14.50
20.00
20.00
20.00

Mode
NA
20.00
20.00
20.00

Std Dev
44.17
32.50
31.56
11.94

4.6 Question Four
What is your estimate of the cost for each person on each TDY?
Question four provides the final number for the travel portion of the cost of
oversight formula. By multiplying the estimates from questions two, three, and four, an
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estimate for the cost of travel in the oversight process can be obtained. Question four
will provide an actual dollar figure estimate for the cost of one TDY for one person on a
team. Results are presented in the same format as previous questions.
4.6.1 Question Four - Low Estimate
Question four’s low estimate began with a somewhat small range compared to
that of previous questions, and closed out with a margin of only $200. Three of the four
panel members estimated the TDY cost per person at $1,000 which made the median and
mode equal to one another. The standard deviation was $100. The panel was only one
member shy of reaching a consensus. All of the results can be seen in Table 4.8 below:
Table 4.8: Question Four - Low Estimate By Round
Frequency
Round

Range

(Member 1,2,3,4)

Mean

Median

Mode

Std Dev

1

$500 to $2000

$2000,$1000,$500.$1000

$1,125.00

$1,000.00

$1,000.00

$629.15

2
3
4

$1000 to $2000
$1000 to $1200
$1000 to $1200

$2000,$1000,$1000,$1000
$1000,$1200,$1000,$1000
$1000,$1200,$1000,$1000

$1,250.00
$1,050.00
$1,050.00

$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00

$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00

$500.00
$100.00
$100.00

4.6.2 Question Four - Average Estimate
The range for the average estimate is slightly higher than that of the low estimates
in the beginning round, but the range closes substantially by the fourth round. And again,
the estimates are just one panel member’s estimate shy of reaching a consensus.
However, the standard deviation decreased from $1,314 to only $250 which is an
acceptable margin. The results are shown in Table 4.9 below.
Table 4.9: Question Four - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$1000 to $4000
$2000 to $4000
$1500 to $2000
$1500 to $2000

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$4000,$2000,$1000,$1500
$4000,$2000,$2000,$2000
$2000,$1500,$2000,$2000
$2000,$1500,$2000,$2000
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Mean
$2,125.00
$2,500.00
$1,875.00
$1,875.00

Median
$1,750.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00

Mode
NA
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00

Std Dev
$1,314.98
$1,000.00
$250.00
$250.00

4.6.3 Question Four - High Estimate
The high estimate for question four had a relatively large range, seen in Table
4.10, but the range constantly reduced throughout all four rounds. The panel members
had not reached a consensus. There were three different estimates at the end of round
four. Results from the high estimates can be seen in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Question Four - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$1500 to $6000
$3000 to $6000
$3000 to $5000
$3000 to $4000

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$6000,$3000,$1500,$2000
$6000,$3000,$3000,$3000
$5000,$3000,$3000,$4000
$4000,$3000,$3500,$4000

Mean
$3,125.00
$3,750.00
$3,750.00
$3,625.00

Median
$2,500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$3,750.00

Mode
NA
$3,000.00
$3,000.00
$4,000.00

Std Dev
$2,015.56
$1,500.00
$957.43
$478.71

4.6.4 Travel Cost Estimate
With all the necessary data collected, it is now possible to develop an overall
estimate for travel costs using the previously mentioned algorithm. To review, the travel
cost estimate will be developed by multiplying the estimates from question two; the
number of TDYs taken by one person, by the estimates from question three; the total
number of persons who go TDY, by the estimates from question four; the cost per person
for each TDY. The results can be seen below in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11: Estimates of Travel Cost for One Milestone
Questions 2-4
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Travel-LOW
$48,000.00
$42,000.00
$60,000.00
$240,000.00
$97,500.00
$95,294.28

Travel-AVG
$400,000.00
$94,500.00
$400,000.00
$1,200,000.00
$523,625.00
$473,355.99

Travel-HIGH
$2,400,000.00
$432,000.00
$2,100,000.00
$4,800,000.00
$2,433,000.00
$1,799,876.66

The estimates were calculated by member for low, average and high and then a
mean and standard deviation was calculated for all five members for the low, average,
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and high estimates. Based on the mean, the end result of four rounds of the Delphi was a
travel estimate that ranges from $97.5K to $2.4M for one milestone.
4.7 Question Five
Estimate how many hours are spent on support for the DAB approval process per
person, not including TDY travel time, but actual job performance while TDY or
at home base. (Slide prep, meeting prep, etc)
In question five, a new segment of the cost of oversight algorithm is started.
Question five is the beginning of the personnel portion of the estimate. With question
five, the goal is to find the number of hours personnel put in directly towards the DAB
process.
4.7.1 Question Five - Low Estimate
The results, shown in Table 4.12, started off with a range of 12 which appears to
be a moderate range. The range stabilized by round three, but the panelists were still
unable to reach a consensus by the end or round four. With a standard deviation of two,
the group managed to get three of the four members to agree on the same number of
hours spent supporting the DAB. The median and mode were equal, and they were only
one off from the mean. The complete results can be seen in Table 4.12:
Table 4.12: Question Five - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
4 to 16
8 to 16
10 to 16
12 to 16

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
4,8,15,16
10,8,15,16
10,10,12,16
12,12,12,16

Mean
10.75
12.25
12
13

Median
11.50
12.5
11
12

Mode
NA
NA
10
12

Std Dev
5.74
3.86
2.83
2.00

4.7.2 Question Five - Average Estimate
The average estimates for question five is completely inconsistent throughout all
of the rounds. The range of estimates from rounds one and four change by only six
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hours. There was no mode during either of the rounds although the mean and median
were equal by round four. The panel members were adamant about their initial estimates
and did not make many changes to their first instinct. Only panel member one changed
their initial estimate more than once throughout the rounds. Table 4.13 shows complete
results below.
Table 4.13: Question Five - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
8 to 24
15 to 24
17 to 24
14 to 24

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
8,16,20,24
15,16,20,24
17,20,18,24
18,14,20,24

Mean
17.00
18.75
19.75
19

Median
18
18
19
19

Mode
NA
NA
NA
NA

Std Dev
6.83
4.11
3.10
4.16

4.7.3 Question Five - High Estimate
As with the average estimates, the high estimates are very unstable. The range
decreased by fourteen hours over the course of the Delphi process, but the panel members
were still unable to come to a consensus. For the high estimate, there was a modal value
of thirty hours. The mean, median and modal values were all within four hours of one
another, and the standard deviation closed out at 4.90. Further results are shown in Table
4.14.
Table 4.14: Question Five - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
16 to 40
24 to 40
25 to 40
30 to 40

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
16,24,30,40
25,24,30,40
30,30,25,40
30,36,30,40

Mean
27.50
29.75
31.25
34
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Median
27.00
27.5
30
33

Mode
NA
NA
30
30

Std Dev
10.12
7.32
6.29
4.90

4.8 Question Six
Estimate how many people are normally involved with the preparation process.
Question six places an actual number of personnel into the second portion of the
algorithm for cost of oversight. The number of personnel involved in the preparation
process included those creating slides, preparing briefings, and supporting the DAB. The
results are given in similar format as previous data collected.
4.8.1 Question Six - Low Estimate
The low estimate had a moderate range at the end of round one. However, the
range began to decrease in round two and by round three the panelists were very close to
a reaching consensus. By round four, the panel members had reached its first consensus
during the process. Although it is not shown below in the table, the final estimate for all
of the panel members was 6 hours. Below in Table 4.15, the results are shown.
Table 4.15: Question Six - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
3 to 15
3 to 10
5 to 6

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
Mean
3,4,15,4
6.50
5,3,10,6
6.35
6,5,6,6
5.75
Reached Consensus

Median
4.00
5.50
6.00

Mode
4.00
NA
6.00

Std Dev
5.69
2.63
0.50

4.8.2 Question Six - Average Estimate
Again the panel reached an overall consensus, but this time they did so at the end
of round three. They determined that for the average estimate, 10 people were normally
involved with the preparation process. All of the results can be seen below in Table 4.16.

60

Table 4.16: Question Six - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3

Range
6 to 20
8 to 15

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
Mean
6,8,20,6
10.00
10,8,15,10
10.75
Reached Consensus

Median
7.00
10.00

Mode
6.00
10.00

Std Dev
6.73
2.99

4.8.3 Question Six-High Estimate
The high estimate, seen below in Table 4.17, also ended up with a consensus by
the end of round three. The panel decided that the high estimate for the number of people
involved in preparation was 15.
Table 4.17: Question Six - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3

Range
9 to 25
12 to 20

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
Mean
9,12,25,12
14.50
15,12,20,14
15.25
Reached Consensus

Median
12.00
14.50

Mode
12.00
NA

Std Dev
7.14
3.40

4.9 Question Seven
Estimate the cost per hour for each person involved in the process.
Question Seven provides the last portion of the personnel cost estimate for the
total cost of oversight. With the estimates provided in question seven, multiplied by the
estimates given in questions five and six, the estimated forecast for the cost of personnel
in the oversight process can be determined.
4.9.1 Question Seven - Low Estimate
In Table 4.18, the low estimates are provided. The estimates changed in the first
two rounds and remained unchanged for the last two rounds. The standard deviation was
reduced and leveled out after round three. The mean, median, and mode remained
constant after round two. In the final round the mean, median and mode were all
different, but were within a total of less than thirteen dollars.
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Table 4.18: Question Seven - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$50 to $100
$70 to $100
$70 to $100
$70 to $100

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$60,$100,$50,$80
$70,$100,$80,$80
$70,$100,$100,$80
$70,$100,$100,$80

$
$
$
$

Mean
72.50
82.50
87.50
87.50

Median
$ 70.00
$ 80.00
$ 90.00
$ 90.00

Mode
NA
$ 80.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00

Std Dev
$ 22.17
$ 12.58
$ 15.00
$ 15.00

4.9.2 Question Seven - Average Estimate
Although the ranges for question seven’s average estimates begin a bit larger than
that of the low estimates, the margin at the end was much smaller. By the end of round
two, the panel members had almost reached a consensus, but the estimates of member
four were very consistent throughout the process up to round three. Member four only
made changes to the original estimate in round four. In the end, the mean was less than
four dollars shy of the median and mode, and the standard deviation minimized to only 5.
All of the results can be seen in Table 4.19.
Table 4.19: Question Seven - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$70 to $150
$120 to $150
$125 to $150
$140 to$150

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$150,$150,$70,$125
$150,$150,$120,$125
$150,$150,$150,$125
$150,$150,$150,$140

$
$
$
$

Mean
123.75
135.25
143.75
147.50

Median
$ 137.50
$ 137.50
$ 150.00
$ 150.00

$
$
$
$

Mode
150.00
150.00
150.00
150.00

Std Dev
$ 37.72
$ 16.01
$ 12.50
$
5.00

4.9.3 Question Seven - High Estimate
The high estimate for question seven started out with a moderate range. There
was not a mode in rounds one in two, but a mode was established and stabilized in round
three. Over the four rounds both the mean and median grew, but the standard deviation
fell throughout the process and finally minimized in round four at 47.26. One thing to
notice about the high estimate was that most members made very few changes to their
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initial estimates. Needless to say, a consensus for the high estimate was not reached.
More details on the results can be seen in Table 4.20.
Table 4.20: Question Seven - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$100 to $300
$150 to $300
$200 to $300
$200 to $300

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$300,$200,$100,$220
$300,$200,$150,$220
$300,$200,$200,$220
$300,$200,$200,$240

$
$
$
$

Mean
205.00
217.50
230.00
235.00

Median
$ 210.00
$ 210.00
$ 210.00
$ 220.00

Mode
NA
NA
$ 200.00
$ 200.00

Std Dev
$ 82.26
$ 62.38
$ 47.61
$ 47.26

4.9.4 Personnel Cost Estimate
With all the necessary data collected, it is now possible to develop an overall
estimate for personnel costs using the previously mentioned algorithm. The personnel
cost estimate will be developed by multiplying the estimates from question five; the
number of hours one person spends in support of a milestone review, by the estimates
from question six; the total number of persons who support a milestone review, by the
estimates from question seven; the cost for one person involved in the milestone review.
The results can be seen below in Table 4.21.
Table 4.21: Estimates of Personnel Cost For One Milestone
Questions 5-7
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Person-LOW
$5,040.00
$7,200.00
$7,200.00
$7,680.00
$6,780.00
$1,181.86

Person-AVG
$27,000.00
$25,200.00
$30,000.00
$33,600.00
$28,950.00
$3,678.31

Person-HIGH
$135,000.00
$129,600.00
$90,000.00
$144,000.00
$124,650.00
$23,851.42

The estimates were calculated by member for low, average and high and then a
mean and standard deviation was calculated for all five members for the low, average,
and high estimates. Based on the mean, the end result of four rounds of the Delphi was a
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personnel cost estimate that ranges from nearly $6.8K to almost $125K for one
milestone.
4.10 Question Eight
Estimate how many meetings are normally held from the PEO preparation,
through DAB approval. (This includes meetings while TDY or TDY prep
meetings).
Question eight provides insight on how meetings are included into the oversight
process. By multiplying questions eight, nine, and ten, we will get an idea of what part
meetings play in the cost of oversight. Question eight deals specifically with the number
of meetings that are held during one milestone in a program. The results are listed in the
following paragraphs.
4.10.1 Question Eight - Low Estimate
The low estimate for meetings held for PEO preparation began with a very wide
range. The gap closed some throughout the Delphi process, but there was not a
consensus in the end. Although a consensus was not reached, a mode of 15 was
established by the end of round four and the standard deviation continued to decrease. At
the end, the standard deviation minimized at 4.24. The results of the low estimates can
be seen in its entirety in Table 4.22.
Table 4.22: Question Eight - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
3 to 48
6 to 20
7 to 20
8 to 18

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
48,3,10,9
20,6,10,18
20,7,10,18
15,8,15,18
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Mean
17.50
13.50
13.75
14.00

Median
9.50
14.00
14.00
15.00

Mode
NA
NA
NA
15.00

Std Dev
20.57
6.61
6.24
4.24

4.10.2 Question Eight - Average Estimate
Again, the average estimates compared to that of the low estimates at the
beginning of the process. However, the average estimates never showed any signs of
stabilization. A mode was never established and the standard deviation minimized at a
high 12.18. The range (12 to 40) was still considerably high after the four rounds. Table
4.23 illustrates the lack of stability in the estimates.
Table 4.23: Question Eight - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
6 to 100
10 to 75
12 to 50
12 to 40

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
100,6,20,12
75,10,20,34
50,12,20,34
40,12,25,34

Mean
34.50
34.75
29.00
27.75

Median
16.00
27.00
27.00
29.50

Mode
NA
NA
NA
NA

Std Dev
44.04
28.58
16.69
12.18

4.10.3 Question Eight - High Estimate
The high estimates for question eight are seen in Table 4.24. As the estimates for
the low and average estimates, the high estimates are just as unstable. The estimates
range from nine to two hundred in round one, and a mode is never established for the
estimates. While the standard deviation stood at 28, the mean and median were 50 and
52 respectively. No consensus was reached in any of the estimates for question eight, but
the results from the high estimates can be found in Table 4.24.
Table 4.24: Question Eight - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
9 to 200
15 to 150
15 to 100
16 to 80

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
200,9,30,18
150,15,25,64
100,15,30,64
80,16,40,64
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Mean
64.25
63.50
52.25
50.00

Median
24.00
44.50
47.00
52.00

Mode
NA
NA
NA
NA

Std Dev
90.91
61.42
37.86
28.00

4.11 Question Nine
What do you estimate as the length, in hours, for each meeting?
Question nine provides a length for each meeting, which will be multiplied by the
number of meetings, provided in question eight and the cost per hour for each person
attending, which will be provided in question ten. Question nine was an estimate that
came in with relatively low standard deviations for each estimate, but overall, was not
significantly volatile from one round to the next. Results are provided in the following
three sub-paragraphs.
4.11.1 Question Nine - Low Estimate
The range for the low estimate in question nine was quite small (3) and was
reduced even more by the end of the process. Only panel members changed their initial
estimates throughout the rounds, but member 2 was the only one that made changes after
round two. The panel members were short one estimate from a consensus in the end and
the margin of separation of the estimates was only .5. The median and mode equaled
each other and the mean differed by .12. The standard deviation was also very small. All
of the results can be seen in Table 4.25.
Table 4.25: Question Nine - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
1 to 4
1 to 2
1.25 to 2
1.5 to 2

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
4,1,2,2
2,1,2,2
2,1.25,2,2
2,1.5,2,2

Mean
2.25
1.75
1.81
1.88

Median
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

Mode
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

Std Dev
1.26
0.50
0.38
0.25

4.11.2 Question Nine - Average Estimate
Question nine’s average estimate should a similar pattern in the range since it too
was quite small. However, the two estimates were different because there was little
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changes made from the initial estimates throughout the process and there were no same
estimates. Therefore, no mode was established. There is little difference in the mean and
median, and the standard deviation is also low. The statistics are favorable only because
the range was small to begin with not because the members had a change of opinion. All
of the results can be seen below in Table 4.26.
Table 4.26: Question Nine - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
2 to 8
2 to 6
2.5 to 5
2.5 to 5

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
8,2,4,3
6,2,4,3
5,2.5,4,3
5,2.5,4,3

Mean
4.25
3.75
3.63
3.63

Median
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50

Mode
NA
NA
NA
NA

Std Dev
2.63
1.71
1.11
1.11

4.11.3 Question Nine - High Estimate
The high estimate for question nine, located in Table 4.27 below, had a much
wider range than that of the low and average estimates previously shown. Although the
mean, median, and mode were equal and the standard deviation was at a low 3.27, the
range was a bit wider than that of the low and average estimates. A consensus was not
met for the high estimate but it would be safe to estimate eight hours as a high estimate
for the length of a meeting.
Table 4.27: Question Nine - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
3 to 20
3 to 15
3.5 to 15
4 to 12

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
20,3,8,8
15,3,8,8
15,3.5,8,8
12,4,8,8
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Mean
9.75
8.50
8.63
8.00

Median
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00

Mode
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00

Std Dev
7.23
4.93
4.75
3.27

4.12 Question Ten
What is the cost per hour of each person involved in the meetings?
Question ten provided the cost per person to include in the final portion of the
cost of oversight estimate for meetings conducted for a milestone. The results of
question ten mirrored the results of question seven, due to both dealing with the cost of
personnel per hour. The results will still be provided separately due to future discussion
on the cost of oversight and the analysis portion of the thesis. The estimates will be
provided in the same format as previous questions.
4.12.1 Question Ten - Low Estimate
The range for the cost per hour was changed very little during the process. In the
end, the range only decreased by $20. Members of the panel made very few changes to
their initial estimates. Although round three showed some promise when a mode was
established, the final results of round four ended without an established mode. Round
four ended with the standard deviation increasing from that established in round three.
Members could not agree on an estimate; therefore, a consensus was not met for the low
estimate. Results have been listed in Table 4.28.
Table 4.28: Question Ten - Low Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$50 to $125
$70 to $125
$70 to $125
$70 to $125

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$60,$100,$50,$125
$70,$100,$80,$125
$70,$100,$100,$125
$70,$100,$125,$110

Mean
$ 83.75
$ 93.75
$ 98.75
$ 101.25

Median
$ 80.00
$ 90.00
$ 100.00
$ 105.00

Mode
NA
NA
$ 100.00
NA

Std Dev
$ 34.97
$ 24.28
$ 22.50
$ 23.23

4.12.2 Question Ten - Average Estimate
Initially there was a very large range amongst the panel members and no mode
had been established. However, by the third round the panel members had locked in their
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estimates and established a mode. The median and mode were the same and the mean
was less than three dollars different from the two. The standard deviation was also
minimized at a low $5 per hour. The range had also decreased to only $10 and the panel
three of the four panel members had reached an agreement on the overall high estimate
cost, but that was still one member’s estimate short of a consensus. The results can be
seen below in Table 4.29.
Table 4.29: Question Ten - Average Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$70 to $200
$120 to $200
$140 to $150
$140 to $150

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$150,$200,$70,$140
$150,$200,$120,$140
$150,$150,$150,$140
$150,$150,$150,$140

Mean
140.00
152.50
147.50
147.50

Median
145.00
145.00
150.00
150.00

Mode
NA
NA
150.00
150.00

Std Dev
53.54
34.03
5.00
5.00

4.12.3 Question Ten - High Estimate
Panel members never really decided on a high estimate. The estimates had a wide
range in the beginning and closed the gap some by the end of round four. Although the
gap of the range reduced, there was no real stability between the panel members. There
were a couple of occasions when a mode was established but in the end, there was no
mode or consensus. The standard deviation was also high at the end of round four. Panel
members were very confident with their estimate early on which shows in their
responses. A complete listing of their responses can be found in Table 4.30.
Table 4.30: Question Ten - High Estimate By Round
Round
1
2
3
4

Range
$100 to $300
$150 to $230
$200 to $300
$230 to $300

Frequency
(Member 1,2,3,4)
$300,$300,$100,$220
$300,$300,$150,$230
$300,$200,$200,$230
$300,$200,$230,$240
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Mean
230.00
245.00
232.50
242.50

Median
260.00
265.00
214.00
235.00

Mode
300.00
300.00
200.00
NA

Std Dev
94.52
71.41
47.17
41.93

4.12.4 Meeting Cost Estimate
With all the necessary data collected, it is now almost possible to develop an
overall estimate for the cost of all the meetings supporting the DAB milestone review
process using the previously mentioned algorithm. The meeting cost estimate will be
developed by multiplying the estimates from question eight; the number of meetings held
from PEO preparation to DAB approval, by the estimates from question nine; the length
in hours of each meeting, by the estimates from question ten; the cost for one person
involved in one meeting. Using the algorithm, we are able to develop a cost estimate for
one person at all of the meetings necessary to get through milestone approval. In order to
come up with an estimate for the cost of all the meetings, the Delphi panel was asked to
provide a low, medium and high estimate for the number of people who attend the
meetings. The results can be seen below in Table 4.31.
Table 4.31: Estimated Number of People Attending Meetings for One Milestone
Member #
1
2
3
4
Mean
Standard Dev

Low
5
6
10
5
Low
6.50
2.38

Med
12
15
20
10
Med
14.25
4.35

High
25
40
30
25
High
30.00
7.07

With all of the necessary today now available, the data was compiled and produced the
following estimates for the cost of the meetings in support of one milestone.
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Table 4.32: Estimate of Meeting Costs for One Milestone
Questions 8-11
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Meeting-LOW
$10,500.00
$7,200.00
$37,500.00
$19,800.00
$18,750.00
$13,590.81

Meeting-AVG
$360,000.00
$67,500.00
$300,000.00
$142,800.00
$217,575.00
$135,637.47

Meeting-HIGH
$7,200,000.00
$512,000.00
$2,208,000.00
$3,072,000.00
$3,248,000.00
$2,841,160.33

The estimates were calculated by member for low, average and high and then a
mean and standard deviation was calculated for all five members for the low, average,
and high estimates. Based on the mean, the end result of four rounds of the Delphi was a
cost of meetings estimate that ranges from about $18.75K to nearly $3.25M for one
milestone.
4.13 Summary of Results
Using a simple algorithm, we were able to develop estimates for the three major
oversight cost portions of a milestone review for an IT or “virtual” MDAP. By adding
these individual estimates together, we can arrive at an overall estimate for the cost of
one milestone decision point. The results of summing the estimates for travel cost,
personnel cost, and meeting cost can be seen below in Table 4.33.
Table 4.33: Estimates for Oversight Cost of One Milestone
Milestone Decision Point (MDP)
MEMBER
MDP Low
1
$63,540.00
2
$56,400.00
3
$104,700.00
4
$267,480.00
MEAN
STD DEV

$123,030.00
$98,624.55
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MDP Avg
$787,000.00
$187,200.00
$730,000.00
$1,376,400.00

MDP High
$9,735,000.00
$1,073,600.00
$4,398,000.00
$8,016,000.00

$770,150.00
$486,232.36

$5,805,650.00
$3,860,017.89

The estimates for milestone costs were calculated in a similar manner to the
estimates for travel, personnel and meetings which was by member for low, average and
high and then a mean and standard deviation was calculated for all five members for the
low, average, and high estimates. The mean statistic shows a milestone oversight cost
range from almost $123K to over $5.8M. By itself, this statistic is interesting enough,
however more value can be added by comparing this range to the range for oversight
costs developed by the Oversight and Review PAT; “this team came up with an average
estimate of $10-12 million for a single milestone and an estimate of $40-50 million for an
entire joint acquisition program in 1994 dollars” (5:9). Using raw inflation indices, the
ORPAT team’s figures can be inflated to fiscal year 2003 dollars or the figures we
developed could be brought back to 1994 dollars. We chose to calculate the latter and the
results can be seen below in Table 4.34.
Table 4.34: FY2003 Milestone Oversight Costs Brought Back to FY1994 Dollars
Milestone Decision Point (MDP)-Adjusted
Milestone
MDP Low
MEAN
$123,030.00
3080 Raw Indice (1994)
0.885
Adjusted Mean
$108,881.55

MDP Avg
$770,150.00
0.885
$681,582.75

MDP High
$5,805,650.00
0.885
$5,138,000.25

As the chart shows, the “high” milestone estimate is nearly half of the cost
estimated by the ORPAT estimate when the dollars are the same. The procurement or
3080 index was used because we’re dealing with the procurement of weapons systems. If
the index for wages was used, the figure would be smaller since the military wage index
is .750 and the civilian employee index is .738 (38:1).
After developing a milestone oversight cost estimate, a total program oversight
cost estimate can be created quite easily. Our methodology for developing a total
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program oversight cost was simply to multiply the milestone figures by three to represent
the three milestones. The assumption here is that each milestone costs relatively the
same. We decided to stick to that assumption because a whole series of research could be
conducted on the cost difference from milestone to milestone. The results of our
calculation for total milestone cost can be seen in Table 4.35 below.
Table 4.35: Estimates for Total Program Oversight Costs
Program
MEMBER
1
2
3
4
MEAN
STD DEV

Program Low
$190,620.00
$169,200.00
$314,100.00
$802,440.00
$369,090.00
$295,873.66

Program Avg
$2,361,000.00
$561,600.00
$2,190,000.00
$4,129,200.00
$2,310,450.00
$1,458,697.07

Program High
$29,205,000.00
$3,220,800.00
$13,194,000.00
$24,048,000.00
$17,416,950.00
$11,580,053.66

Looking at the range on the mean we see a total program oversight cost estimate
from a little over $369K to over $17.4M. Again, these results can be compared to the
range developed by the ORPAT team of $40-$50 million. To make the comparison
meaningful we again brought our figures back to 1994 dollars. The results can be seen in
Table 4.36 below.
Table 4.36: FY2003 Total Oversight Costs Brought Back to FY1994 Dollars
Program
MEAN
3080 Raw Indice (1994)
Adjusted Mean

Program Low
$369,090.00
0.885
$326,644.65

Program Avg
$2,310,450.00
0.885
$2,044,748.25

Program High
$17,416,950.00
0.885
$15,414,000.75

The “high” program oversight cost estimate of just over $15.4M is still well
below the estimate of $40-$50 million developed by the ORPAT. The ORPAT estimate
however, may be on the high side since back when it was developed little information on
the effectiveness of “virtual” acquisition programs were known.
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The goal of the Delphi Method was to complete at least four rounds while trying
to reach consensus. The objectives were clear for how consensus would be determined.
The rule was met for all ten questions provided in the survey and all objectives for the
data collection portion were met.
Now that the estimates have been provided, the information will be placed in
statistical software as a database. Each respondent will have their estimates entered for
each question. These estimates will be compared with other respondents from the theses
research conducted by Rousseau (35:1) and DeReus (16:1). When comparing all of the
estimates together, an analysis of variance test will be conducted by question, by type of
regulatory guidance policy programs typically fall under (i.e., NSSAP 03-01, DoDD
5000 series, or Virtual oversight). Once this analysis has been completed, the results and
analysis will be presented in chapter five to see if there truly is a difference in the cost of
oversight among programs.
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5.0 Analysis
5.1 Overview
The goal of Chapter 5 is to compare the results of the final round of Delphi
surveys for each of the acquisition disciplines examined. The first section will contain a
question by question statistical comparison of final responses submitted by the panel
members. Using the methodology described in Chapter 3, a comparison of the three
processes are conducted. Question one contains qualitative discussions for the cost
drivers identified, but will list all drivers to complete the goal of research question three.
Questions two through ten are quantitatively compared with a significance level of .05 for
testing the null hypothesis of finding any statistical differences in the mean, for the
forecast data collected. Each question will include a discussion on where the differences
are and discuss some of the similarities among the different disciplines, answering
research question two.
Recommendations for future research in oversight costs will be discussed in the
final section. The final section will also provide any insights gained during this research
which may help make our acquisition process function more efficiently. Finally, any
future research efforts that could continue to build on this thesis will be provided to assist
in defining the cost of oversight in MDAPs in the future
5.2 Question One
From the Program Executive Officer (PEO) request for a Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB to the DAB milestone approval, what are the five major cost drivers
in the oversight process?
While the results from the Space programs focuses on TDY expense and salaries
of contract employees, the results from the IT and “Box” programs focuses more on the
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program and the acquisition processes. The cost drivers selected by the Box panel
members were program driven. Multi-service programs, new programs, and program
upgrades, especially technological upgrades were among the top cost drivers. Results
from chapter four revealed that the IT community believed process and requirements
changes were the main cost drivers. They also felt that trust between OSD and program
leaders was an issue that drove cost higher. It seems that both the IT and Box programs
have issues at a higher level than that of Space programs. The cost drivers identified by
these two programs will require some directive changes to eliminate most of them, but
the drivers identified by the Space panel members are at a lower level. TDYs can be
managed by the PMs in most cases and they usually have some flexibility on the contract
personnel hired to support the program. Because both the IT and Box programs are
required to follow the guidelines established by the DoD 5000 series, they have more
“red tape” that restricts their flexibility to eliminate the unnecessary obstacles throughout
their MDA approval process, and the Space program has been given permission to
establish its own guidelines to follow. By doing so, they have internally eliminated the
“red tape”. The top five cost drivers selected by each group of panel members are shown
in table 5.1. In the table, the Box program is represented by DoDD 5000, Space is simply
Space, and IT is C3I.
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Table 5.1: Cost Drivers for Oversight Processes
Drivers Picked--DoD 5000
Program is Multi-Service
Whether Completely new system or just block upgrade
Number of Technologies going into the system
Number of Systems the System must interact with
Milestone B (requires most documents; 30 to be generated for review)

Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Drivers Picked--Space
Time away from primary responsibilities while supporting IPA at expense of rest of program
TDY from the program office IPA or IPA folks to program office
IPA Personnel Costs (Program Evaluation)
Salaries of IPA core members and "gray beard" members who are not government employees
IPA Travel/Per Diem costs (Team and support personnel)

Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Drivers Picked--C3I
Lack of functional requirements that are clearly defined and understood
Changing oversight requirements…changing personalities, policy etc.--requires climbing learning curve
again
Lack of established architectures and the resulting need for unique C4ISP efforts
The serial process of document approval by the several echelons of oversight
Negotiating viewpoints of the various stakeholders…acq strategy re-do

Rank
1
2
3
4
4

5.3 Question Two
From the PEO recommendation, to the DAB approval of the milestone, use your
professional judgment and estimate how many TDYs are taken by one person to
get one program through one Milestone.
When comparing question two, there were statistical differences for all three
oversight processes when comparing the Box and Space programs with the IT programs
except for one (high estimate of the Box and IT programs). Table 5.2 shows that at all
levels of the forecasts, none of the estimates for the Space program were statistically
similar to IT oversight. However, the shaded area shows that the high estimate of the
Box program is statistically similar to the high estimate of the IT program. Because both
programs follow the same guidelines, the worst case scenarios should be somewhat
similar which may be the reason the high estimates of the two programs are similar.
Although one would expect the IT programs would have the least amount of TDYs
throughout the approval process for each milestone, the data shows that the Space
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program actually goes on fewer TDYs than both the IT and Box programs. This is ironic
because under the IT process, program information is accessible to all interested parties.
Table 5.2: ANOVA for Question Two
Question 2
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0004
0.0038
0.0075
0.008
0.0317
0.1766

5.4 Question Three
Estimate how many people normally go TDY throughout the Milestone Decision
process.
In question three, there were not any significant statistical differences when
looking for the number of people that actually go TDY in the MDA/KDP process.
According to the information provided in table 5.3, there are no statistical differences
between the different oversight processes in the number of people going TDY. Although
every member in the IT approval process has access to program data, there is still a
relatively higher number of people traveling in support of their programs during the
MDA process. Therefore, contrary to what one might expect, the IT process has only a
slightly lower number of people going TDY than that of either the Box or Space
programs.
Table 5.3: ANOVA for Question Three
Question 3
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0811
0.1071
0.1345
0.2769
0.2335
0.1612
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5.5 Question Four
What is your estimate of the cost for each person on each TDY?
The results of question four when compared to the other two program types
varied. The low estimate revealed that there were statistical differences between Space
and IT; however, there were no statistical differences at the average and high estimates.
On the other hand, there were no statistical differences with the Box program at the low
estimate level, but there were statistical differences at both the average and high estimate
levels. When comparing cost per person for the IT programs’ personnel to that of the
Box and Space programs, the comparisons are total opposites. Differences amongst the
different program types are found in table 5.4.
Table 5.4: ANOVA for Question Four
Question 4
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0008
0.0582
0.1143
0.4071
0.0123
0.0017

5.6 Question Five
Estimate how many hours are spent on support for the DAB approval process per
person, not including TDY travel time, but actual job performance while TDY or
at home base. (Slide prep, meeting prep, etc)
Question five results are located in Table 5.5 and it shows that there were
statistical differences between IT and the other two programs at each estimate level.
When comparing IT estimates with the Space estimates, the preparation hours were lower
in the IT programs at the lower, average, and higher estimate levels. Information
accessibility should be given credit for the differences. One would believe that the
availability of program data to all concerned parties help eliminate the need for numerous
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hours of meeting preparation. Any information that may be needed is already available.
PMs would only have to prepare for the possible questions about the data that may need
to be answered during the meeting.
The IT program’s estimates were also lower than that of the Box programs. Once
again the accessibility of the program data in the IT programs made the difference. The
Box programs are usually overloaded with questions about their programs. Because
miniscule details of the program data are held at the program office levels, PMs are
required to flow that data to the upper levels of management. Therefore, they must spend
more time preparing for meetings in order to be able to answer the questions that may
come up during the meetings. The number of meetings required between each level of
approval also contribute to the larger amount of time required for the Box programs.
This is a significant finding because it shows potential cost reductions a virtual process
may have if adopted by other programs.
Table 5.5: ANOVA for Question Five
Question 5
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0019
0.0012
0.0007
0.0039
0.0003
0.0002

5.7 Question Six
Estimate how many people are normally involved with the preparation process.
Once again the statistical data reveals that the IT and Space programs are
statistically different in all three estimates. Again, it is assumed that the virtual process
of data availability used in the IT programs is the main reason for this difference. It is
assumed that when data is available to everyone in the decision making process, there are
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fewer people required to prepare that decision maker for a meeting because the
information needed is at his or her fingertips. Based on the raw data, the number of
people normally involved in the IT preparation process is lower than the Space and Box
programs. Although the number of people involved in the preparation process in the IT
program is lower than the Box programs, statistically, there are no differences between
the two programs. Although it seems impossible, the two programs are required to
follow the same DoD 5000 series’ rules and regulations; therefore, the two programs
should not be statistically different. The number of meetings required and the essential
personnel are set by regulation which may explain the statistical similarities of the
programs. The statistical comparisons of the programs are shown below in table 5.6.
Table 5.6: ANOVA for Question Six
Question 6
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0001
0.002
0.0001
0.1906
0.1331
0.0587

5.8 Question Seven
Estimate the cost per hour for each person involved in the process.
For the most part, there is a significant difference between IT and Space and IT
and Box programs. However, there is no statistical difference between the IT and Space
programs for the high estimates. The raw data shows that estimates for the lower and
average cost were higher for IT programs, but the high estimates of the two programs
were somewhat closer in terms of dollars. However, the results for the IT program are
significantly higher in all areas than the Box estimates. These differences may be due to
the pay grades involved. While Box programs generally have lower grades involved in
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the preparation process to get the PMs prepared for meetings, IT managers uses the
virtual network to get the necessary information. And although less hours are spent
preparing for meetings, the cost per hour is higher; therefore, the cost per hour will be
significantly higher for the IT program. The statistical comparisons of the different
programs can be seen below in table 5.7.
Table 5.7: ANOVA for Question Seven
Question 7
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.003
0.0001
0.2178
0.0012
0.0001
0.0004

5.9 Question Eight
Estimate how many meetings are normally held from the PEO preparation,
through DAB approval. (This includes meetings TDY or TDY prep meetings).
Of all the comparisons, there was a single statistical significance found. When
comparing the means in the ANOVA test, the low estimates for the Space and IT
programs there was a significant statistical difference. Although the other comparisons
did not show any differences at the .05 significance level, there were still some notable
differences when reviewing the main data collected. Both the IT and Space programs
had a low number of meetings while the Box programs continued to show a large number
of meetings held during the MDA approval process. One might conclude that the
waivers to the DoD 5000 series’ procedures obtained by these two programs allowed
them to streamline the meetings being held to obtain MDA and KDP approval. However,
based on the results, there are no statistical differences between the number of meetings
held in IT programs and either Space or Box programs. The differences will appear when
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dollar values are placed on those meetings held by each program. Comparisons of the
three program’s number of meetings held are shown in table 5.8 below.
Table 5.8: ANOVA for Question Eight
Question 8
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0372
0.1248
0.1306
0.1129
0.2234
0.2686

5.10 Question Nine
What do you estimate as the length, in hours, for each meeting?
Comparisons for the estimated length of meetings between IT and Space as well
as between IT and Box programs are shown in table 5.9. The results shows there are no
statistical differences in either comparison. As a matter of fact, the mean of the IT and
Space programs are identical. Although the raw data for total time required for meetings
show differences amongst the programs, the statistical data of the mean shows there is
not enough evidence to prove a statistical difference.
Table 5.9: ANOVA for Question Nine
Question 9
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0601
1.00
0.6963
0.2977
0.3489
0.3326

5.11 Question Ten
What is the cost per hour of each person involved in the meetings?
Once again, there appear to be statistical differences between IT programs and
that of the Space and Box programs. Only the high estimates of IT and Space programs
show no statistical differences. The meeting cost per hour for the IT programs are
significantly higher than both the Space and Box programs. In some instances, the IT
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cost nearly doubles and sometimes triples the cost of the other programs. However, at
the high estimate level there is not enough statistical evidence to prove a difference
between the IT and Space programs. The pay grades of the individuals attending these
meetings must again be attributed for the significant differences between the programs.
Since most of the pre-meetings are eliminated from use of the real-time virtual database,
high level personnel meet to make the decisions necessary for program progression.
Although the raw data is not shown, table 5.10 shows the statistical data for the means.
Table 5.10: ANOVA for Question Ten
Question 10
COMPARISON
C3I vs Space
C3I vs 5000

p-Values (.05 significance level)
LOW
AVG
HIGH
0.0028
0.0001
0.1008
0.0026
0.0001
0.0002

5.12 Summary of Results
Overall, the three research questions that were stated as goals for this thesis have
been answered. The total cost of oversight has been calculated as an estimate for the
MDA process under the RIT Pilot Study process, the top five cost drivers have been
identified, and finally, when compared to the other processes, the research question
dealing with any statistical differences in the cost of oversight between the different
oversight processes has been answered for all but one combination; total cost
comparison.
After getting answers to the other questions, a final comparison for the total cost
of oversight was taken to determine if there were any statistical differences between the
three program types. Given our assumptions from chapter one, results of the analysis
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show no statistical differences for the cost of oversight between the programs. Results of
the analysis are shown in table 5.11 below.
Table 5.11: ANOVA for Total Cost Comparison
Total Cost
p-Values (.05 significance level)
COMPARISON
LOW
AVG
HIGH
Space vs C3I
0.1625
0.1932
0.5188
Space vs 5000
0.1393
0.117
0.1629
5000 vs C3I
0.1655
0.1557
0.343

Although no statistical differences were shown when the data was analyzed, the
ranges for total cost were very different. The total range of cost, estimated by the panel
members for the three programs, was as low as $82K to as high as $94M. A complete
look at the ranges can be found in table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Total Cost Ranges by Oversight Process within Range
Process
C3I
Space
5000

Low Range
$201,000 to $861,840
$82,434 to $222,000
$417,600 to $8,581,680

Average Range
$696,600 to $4,471,920
$1,271,250 to $1,779,187
$3,219,960 to $27,931,500

High Range
$3,028,800 to $52,605,000
$11,443,500 to $26,019,000
$11,838,240 to 94,968,000

With such a range of cost, it is inevitable that each process has its own cost savings
potential. Table 5.13 shows the means of the total program cost. As you can see the
Space program has the lowest average for the total program cost; but in the following
section, recommendations to reduce cost even lower will be made.
Table 5.13: Average (Mean) Total Cost by Program
Process
C3I
Space
5000

Low Range
$399,735
$146,379.75
$3,758,590.08

Average Range
$2,777,505
$1,534,359.38
$13,417,272
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High Range
$23,679,750
$15,979,687.50
$44,211,936

5.13 Recommendations
After calculating the total costs for the IT process and comparing those costs with
the Space and Box programs, perhaps there is a way to reduce the overall program cost
for all programs if processes are taken from the programs with the least amount of
oversight cost. The results show that the Space program has the lowest TDY and meeting
cost and the IT program has the lowest preparation cost. By combining some of the
Space and IT procedures, there may be evidence that the total oversight cost can be
reduced. Therefore, I would recommend using the IPA process but the virtual
accessibility of the program data should also be incorporated into the process. This
process should produce the least amount of cost based on the comparisons made from this
study and the studies conducted by DeReus (16:1) and Rousseau (35:1). If these changes
are made for all programs in the acquisition process, there is much potential for the
overall program cost to decrease. Of the three programs, the mean total program cost for
the Space program was lower in each of the categories, low, average and high cost
estimates. However, if you used the overall meeting and travel cost from the original
Space program numbers and add that number to the personnel cost from the IT program,
DoD could realize some savings in oversight cost. Although more research in this area
would need to be done to validate this proposal, by implementing a virtual database into
the Space programs’ acquisition process the total program cost for program oversight can
be reduced by as little as $55K to more than $4.5M. The funds can be realized either
directly or indirectly by saving man-hours or actual bottom-line budget savings. Either
way, some sort of live program test or feasibility study should be performed. An
example of the potential oversight cost savings are shown in table 5.14.
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Table 5.14: Potential Cost Reductions with IPA + Virtual Database
Process
Space
Space/Virtual
Potential Savings

Low Range
$146,379.75
$91,404.75
$54,975.00

Average Range
$1,534,359.38
$865,771.88
$668,587.50

High Range
$15,979,687.50
$11,475,450.00
$4,504,237.50

5.14 Follow-on Possibilities
This research was just a beginning. This study produced a baseline to calculating
the cost of oversight for a major defense acquisition program, but there is a lot of
potential for further research in this area. A study of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Agency’s acquisition process in comparison of the IT, Space, and Box programs could be
conducted. Cost oversight below the PM level can also be researched to determine if
there is potential to save additional funds by streamlining the oversight. Because this
study focused only on Air Force programs, further studies can be conducted for the cost
of oversight of the sister services (i.e. Army, Navy, and Marines). A study that compares
the oversight costs of the Air Force and its sister services is another research project.
These are just a few of the endless possibilities of research in this area. This research has
provided a basic way to identify oversight cost within MDAPs.
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